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PREFACE
'No man can sit down to write about
the history of his own times- or
perhaps of any time- without bringing
to the task the preconceptions which
sprin� out of his own character....
This is the inescapable condition of
the historians work, an-d the present
study is no more exempt from these
limitations than any other account of
the events of the past. •l
The following thesis offers an impression of American
opinion toward specific events relating to the rise of Nazi
Germany through an analysis of selected newspaper editorials
and articles. While the direct influence of public opinion upon
foreign policy can rarely be documented, there seems to be a
general agreement that an "intimate" relationship does exist
l
between the two.2 This interdependence u- timately generates a
form of symbiosis, which permits an examination of one of these
areas to lend insight into the other.
Fundamentally, the relationship between our political
leaders, the press, and the general public has always been one
of interaction.

l

"Each is a significant force in its own right,

Alan Bullock, Hitler-A Study in Tyranny.
States: First Perennial Library, 1971), p. viii.
2

{United

Melvin Small, Public O pinion and Historians.
Wayne State University Press, 1970, p-:-T5.

(Detroit:

but all are part of a cycle in· which the leadership continu-

2

ously seeks support (from) the press and public so that
effective policy decisions can be made.113 In fact, government
officials and newsmen are so mutually dependent upon one another
that it is virtually impossible for either to function effectively
for any length of time without the other's cooperation.4
Though it is beyond the scope of this particular research,
studies have been done which discuss the government's attempt to
influence the press.5 This manipulation assumes a variety of
forms, including the controlled release of information through
White House briefings as well as deliberate 'leaks'. These actions
are often intended to sway public opinion in a certain direction,
usually in conformity with the policy which the government has
already adopted. This further emphasizes the interdependence
between public opinion and foreign policy, and the symbiotic bond
mentioned earlier.

3

The Federal Government-Daily Press Relationship.
(Washington, D.C.: The American Institute for Political Communi
cation, 1967), p. 109.
4

5

Ibid., p. 16.

For more information consult: George Berdes, Friendly
Adversaries: The Press and Government. (Marquette University:
College of Journalism, 1969) or James Reston, The Artillery of
the Press. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

Turning specifically to the role played by public

3

opinion, it normally involves the public defining a broad
strategy for the government to pursue, and the President in
conjunction with his administrators seeking to devise the
measures needed for these goals to be obtained. The State
Department has openly admitted the influence which public
opinion has on foreign policy decisions, if not in actually
initiating the programs themselves, then at least in limiting
the options available for consideration.6
Editorial opinions are only one of the conduits whereby
this flow of principles and ideas between the government and
public can be exchanged. Yet it serves as one of the few sources
of information for this topic, since modern public opinion polling
did not come into extensive use in the United States until the
late 1930 1 s. Thus it is virtually impossible to analyze the
typical American's attitudes prior to this period except through
indirect means.7 To support the selection of newspapers as one
of the more significant tools for accomplishing this purpose, it
should be pointed out that sociologists Robert S. and Helen M.
Lynd found newspapers to be the single most important medium for

6

Small, Public Opinion, p. 15.

7

Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy.
(New York: William Morrow & Company, 1978), p. 25. For more in
formation on the drawbacks to public opinion polls-sample size,
unbiased questioning, etc.- see Charles W. Roll & Albert H. Cantril,
In Politics� (New York: Basic Books Inc.,
and Misuse Polls-Their Use 1972).

8
information during the mid-l930's. Furthermore, even as

4

late as the 1940 1 s studies have shown that up to half of the
entire American population relied almost exclusively upon the
daily paper for their news on foreign affairs.9 Consequently,
the papers selected for this study-which represent nearly four
and a half percent of the total daily newspaper circulation in
the United States- certainly had a significant influence upon
their respective regions of the country.lo They served as the
primary filter through which information relating to inter
national affairs passed to their readers.

It is reasonable to

assume that their interpretations of events in Germany in the
early 1930 1 s both influenced and reflected the prevailing
opinion existing in this country at the time.
While it is not the intention of this work to imply that
editorial opinions and public opinion should be directly equated,
it is admittedly difficult to measure and define precisely what
'public opinion' entails. The selection of editorials and
articles in this study may provide some indication, in hopes of
lending greater insight into this area which has yet to be fully
explored.

8

Ibid., p. 23.

9

Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign olicy. (Prince
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 256.
10

1937).

The World Almanac - 1937. (New York: N.Y. World-Telegram,

5

INTRODUCTION
While the German nation was gradually being transformed
from a troubled republic into an ideological dictatorship, the
Western World was caught in the midst of a deep depression.

In

light of these domestic problems which were consuming most of
their attention, it is the purpose of this investigation to attempt
to assess the extent to which the American public was aware of the
events occurring in Germany between the years 1930 to 1936.

While

there appears to have been an ample number of warnings of the
trouble which lay ahead, somehow these signals were never totally
appreciated in either the United States or Europe - all to the
advantage of Hitler and the National Socialists.
The difficulty in assessing the public's general knowledge
or opinion of what was happening in Germany at this time has pre
sented a major challenge; yet if one considers the newspaper media
as not only a device influencing public opinion, but reflecting it
as well, a solution does become available.

By selecting various

influential papers throughout this country, a cross-section of
American public opinion can be indirectly approximated.
The nation of Germany was stunned by the news of an
armstice in 1918, particularly in view of the military 1 s policy of
concealing or minimizing reversals to the people.

Now the stark

reality was suddenly thrust upon them, and the typical citizen was

6

at a loss to understand what had happened.

Feeling confused

and even betrayed, the people of Germany embarked upon one of
the most turbulent periods in their history.

In attempting to

come to grips with the challenges of returning to peace, the
country likewise had to contend with the sanctions imposed by
the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles.

While many historians

have judged these demands as unreasonable, the victors of 1919
lacked the advantages of hindsight and found it hard to forget
the injuries which Germany had inflicted upon them must a few
years earlier.

It was, as Churchill said, an unparalleled

event in history:
For four years Germany fought and defied
the. five continents of the world by land and sea
and air. The German armies upheld her tottering
confederates, intervened in every theatre of war
with success, stood everywhere on conquered terri
tory and inflicted on their enemies more than twice
the bloodshed they suffered themselves. To break
their strength and science and to curb their fury
it was necessary to bring all the greatest nations
of mankind into the field against them. Overwhelming
populations, unlimited resources, measureless sacri
fice, the sea blockade, could not prevail for fifty
months. Small states were trampled down in the
struggle; a mighty empire was battered into unrecog
nisable fragments; and nearly twenty million men
perished or shed their blood before the sword· was
wrested from that terrible hand. Surely, Germans,
for history it is enough! 1
While German moderates struggled against the armed
hostility of both the communists and supernationalists to forge
a democratic republic, the Allies devised a punative treaty which

l

Gola Mann, The History of Germany Since 1789. (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 342.

7
the hapless Republicans of Weimar had no choice but to accept.
The treaty forced Germany to admit sole responsibility for the
war and to pay reparations to the victors; it limited her army
and denied her a navy; it decreed the occupation of the Rhineland
for over 15 years; and it separated the Saar, whose mineral
wealth was available for France to exploit.2 This harsh agree
ment, which was designed to preserve peace, contributed towards
its own destruction. Many Germans felt they had been deceived
both by the government which now represented them and by the
Allies who had once offered them a 'just' settlement in the form
of Wilson's Fourteen Points.
The mood in Germany was further inflamed by the drastic
rise in unemployment and inflation. For a country already
exhausted by war, what were the prospects for millions of demo
bilized men to be absorbed into the labor market? How could a
nation deprived of its most valuable industrial areas possibly
meet the exhorbitant reparations schedule and its nonnal expenses
as well?

It could not. Inflation went rampant throughout the

country, and the mark collapsed. By 1923, the German currency
was worth less than one ten-thousandth of its pre-war level,
and still the treasury printed more money to meet its increasing
needs. As the rich became richer, the poor became poorer. Social
unrest spread throughout Germany.

2

Ibid., p. 346.

:B
It was ami.d this atmosphere of tension and strife that
a man named Adolf Hitler was soon to start his rise to the
pinnacle of power.

One could hardly imagine a less likely

candidate to become the leader of Germany than this poorly educated
son of a humble civil servant; he was not even a citizen of Germany,
but of Austria.

His military record was undistinguished, and at

the war 1 s conclusion he departed without money, friends, or hope
for a traditional career.

His only major asset was his ability to

appeal to the common man.
After initially joining the German Workers• Party in 1919,
Hitler devoted his incredible energy towards becoming a political
messiah.

His masterful application of propaganda techniques gained

him the public 1 s attention and increased his party 1 s following.
In his speeches of 1923, Hitler promoted the belief that the Republic
was totally corrupt and acting against the interests of the people.
When the French occupied the Ruhr in that same year, Hitler launched
a feeble putsch to overthrow the government.

While the attempt was

a complete disaster, it taught him a valuable lesson--he must use
the system in order to destroy it!
Following a prison term, during which he wrote Mein Kampf,
Hitler emerged to bring all the nationalist parties under his
leadership.

From 1925 to 1929, he spent most of his time in

rightist circles trying to strengthen the party 1 s foundation as
Germany appeared to be recovering.

The collapse of Wall Street in

October of 1929, however, was especially hard felt in Gennany.
The growing economic crisis brought Communists and Nationalists

9
alike into the streets, each attacking the other and both
attacking the impotent government under President van Hindenburg
and Heinrich Bruening.
A series of events during the 1930's allowed Hitler to
gain supreme power in Germany and then revitalize her military
strength.

These incidents provide the focal points for each of

the upcoming chapters, �nd include: ()) the first major Nazi
victory at the polls in 1930;
1932;

(2) the Presidential campaign of

(3) Hitler's appointment to the Chancellorship in 1933;

(4) the Reichstag fire and its aftermath;
of 1934;

(5) the 1 blood purge'

(6) Hindenburg's death and the rearmament of Germany;

and finally,

(7) the repudiation of the Locarno Treaty and the

military takeover of the Rhineland.

While naturally there were

many other events during this period which could have been con
sidered--such as the German withdrawal from the League of Nations
in 1933 or the passage of the anti-Jewish "Nuremberg Laws" in
1935--these selected developments were particularly;crucialJto
Hitler's attainment of total power and were generally given more
attention by the press.
As Hitler proceeded to establish himself in Germany,
most Americans found themselves preoccupied with the Great
Depression.

Millions of people had lost everything they owned,

and banks and businesses in general were having to close their
doors.

President Hoover assured the nation that prosperity was

'just around the corner', but his construction program for public

10
highways and buildings fell short of what was needed.

The

country was ready for a change and consequently elected Franklin
Roosevelt as President in 1932.

When he assumed office in early

1933, he vigorously promoted a series of measures designed to
get the nation back on its feet.

This was part of the 'New Deal'

which was designed to create new jobs and shift the burden on to
the backs of those best able to afford it.

The economy began a

slow recovery, and Roosevelt was re-elected by a wide majority
in the year 1936.
Although absorbed by these domestic problems currently
plaguing the nation, Americans were not totally unaware of the
developments in Europe.

Understandably, however, they failed to

recognize the ominous patterns or appreciate the drastic conse
quences of Hitler's actions.

How much did the public know and

what was their interpretation? The answer is necessarily imprecise,
but studies of the editorials included in this survey provide in
sights into the issue.
The first portion of each of the upcoming chapters is
devoted to a basic description of the event itself, which normally
would have been provided by the Associated Press in most of these
papers.

This information is drawn from the standard works on this

period, and include:
ship (1970);
Joachim

c.

Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictator

Alan Bullock, Hitler-A Study in Tyranny (1964);

Fest, Hitler (1973);

Fall of the Third Reich (1960).

William L. Shirer, The Rise and

11

Each su_rnmary is then followed by an analysis of the
editorial commentary offered by the papers themselves. Th.ese
papers, which were selected both on the basis of their geographic
locations (attached, p. 12) and their influence, include the
following:

the Atlanta Constitution (circulation 92,897 daily

and 133,473 on Sundays);

the Chicago Tribune (838,422 daily --

1,235,442 Sunday); the Dallas Morning News (89,055 daily -102,305 Sunday);
Sunday);

the Los Angeles Times (162,959 daily -- 246,453

the Minneapolis Tribune (72,263 daily -- 170,704 Sunday);

the New York Times (437,367 daily -- 752,689 Sunday);

the Richmond

Times-Dispatch (66,848 daily -- 70,005 Sunday); the Rocky Mountain
News (45,337 daily -- 70,120 Sunday); and the Washington Post
(76,006 daily -- 86,323 Sunday).3
Offering a wide diversity of opinion on a variety of issues,
these publications differed both in the quality as well as quantity
of editorials which they gave to the events in Germany. There was
never a common editorial voice in any of these key events, and for
several of the papers (e.g. the Los Angeles Times and Minneapolis
Tribune), there was little consistency in their interpretations
from one event to another.

phia:

3_____
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Chapter One
THE REICHSTAG ELECTION
September 1930

Narrative of Events
Arising from the chaotic depths experienced since its
defeat in the First World War, the German nation by 1929 had
taken significant strides towards recovery.

This accomplishment

had gradually diluted the elements of discontent upon which
National Socialism was bred, though almost overnight this situa
tion was radically altered as the worldwide depression reached
Germany and the rest of Europe.

Now the agitator who had long

awaited such a dis�ster cited this new crisis as proof that the
current regime was a failure.

Adolf Hitler began to assume a

position of prominence among the political figures of his day,
and in the year 1930-for the first time since its inceptionthe Nazi Party demonstrated it was a formidable and viable
political organization.
The economic crisis resulted in bankruptcy and collapse
to many small businesses and industries, while causing a drastic
rise in unemployment and the disruption of German society.

Its

effects were not limited to the working class, but encompassed
the middle and lower classes, who felt equally threatened with
the loss of their livelihoods and personal integrity.

The

14

peasants and far�ers tried desperately but unsuccessfully to
escape the incessant demands being thrust upon them for rent
and taxes.

As the crisis deepened, the number of people alienated

by the present administration grew in size and became increasingly
receptive to the demagoguery of a man like Hitler who expressed
their frustration so well.
Under these turbulent conditions, an influential group of
critics and enemies of the Republic, predominantly from the Right,
assumed positions of strategic importance from which they led the
country away from democracy towards a system characterized by one
party rule. With the failure of the Grand Coalition to reach a
political compromise in the spring of 1930, Presidential rule was
swiftly evoked to allow a restructuring of the state toward an
authoritarian model favored by the Right.1 This provided the
needed excuse for further agitation by various interest groups
who advocated anti-democratic measures and the institution of a
dictatorship.2
As the economic situation continued to worsen, the
Chancellor of the Republic, Heinrich Bruning, dissolved the
Reichstag for its refusal to support him in his rule. In the

l

Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship. (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 171. The Grand Coalition was
an alliance of Social Democrats, Centre, and left-wing Liberal
political factions which together formed the basis for a working
majority in the Reichstag and held the Republic intact.
2

Ibid., pp. 170-71. Special interests groups such as
employer organizations and trade unions were included.

15
ensuing election campaign, the Nazis employed numerous imagina
tive ploys to draw additional strength and attention to their
cause. The paramilitary arm of the party, the S.A., carried
the campaign to the streets, plastering posters (or heads) on
virtually every street corner and holding massive demonstrations
throughout the country. Hitler, in �urn, provided the people with
the scapegoats on which to blame their ills-namely, the French,
the Jews, the Allies, and most especially the Republic.3
To a people drained both financially and emotionally,
Hitler lent a renewed.sense of vigor and pride. As quoted by
Alan Bullock, Hitler vehemently stated:

11The Germans are the

greatest people on earth. It is not your fault that you were
defeated in the war and have suffered so much since. It is because
you were betrayed in 1918 and exploited ever since by those envious
of you...let Germany awake and renew her strength.114
Election day, September 14th, 1930, marked the turning
point for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. It signified the 'end
of the reign of democratic parties' and announced the initial
death.throes of the Republic.5 With roughly 18 percent of the
votes cast in their support, the Nazis surged from only 12 seats

3Bullock, Hitler, p. 82.
4

p. 287.

rbid.

5Joachim

c.

Fest, Hitler.

(New York: Vintage Books, 1975),

16
in the Reichstag to a respectable 107.

The Party now found

itself second only to the Social Democrats, with a legitimate
claim to the leadership of the Right.

All other parties had

suffered huge and unexpected losses, with the exception of the
Communists, who received modest gains.
This surprising Nazi performance convinced not only
millions of citizens, but business and military leaders as well,
that perhaps Hitler was indeed the rising star of the future.
While the party's ideology focused more on action than on a true
philosophy, it had accomplished what no other party had seemed
able to do: it had aroused the traditional feelings of the German
people towards patriotism and nationalism, which were to many
only a memory.

It was, in a word, a success.

Many of the analysts abroad, both in England and the
United States, recognized the underlying significance of the
German election and attributed the results to

11

the {deepening)

crisis of the party, or.... (an) expression of a spreading lack
of faith in the liberal and capitalist systems, coupled with a
6

desire for a fundamental change in all conditions of life. 11

What they were actually witnessing, however, was a testimony to
the lesson Hitler had learned much earlier:

that even the

shakiest form of government remained secure against attacks from

6

Ibid., p. 288.
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the streets.

He was determined, therefore, to play by the

rules of the system, then try to destroy it.
* * * * * * * * * *
Editorial Analysis
The American press gave relatively little attention to
the political contest in Germany until after the fact.

This·

apparent lack of concern is not difficult to understand; the lack
of extensive European coverage that had characterized American
journalism during the 1920 1 s was now exacerbated by the focus on
critical conditions at home stemming from the Great Depression.
Furthermore, the Reichstag election had become significant only
in retrospect, as even the Germans themselves were surprised by
the outcome.
Predominantly the headlines of the papers in this survey
revolved around several major domestic issues during the period
leading up to and immediately following the September 14th
German election.

Prohibition was by far the most controversial

topic at this moment, since the upcoming state elections throughout
this country brought the matter into bitter debate during these
campaigns.

Another major topic at this time was the nomination

of Frank B. Kellogg as the American representative to the World
Court.

This drew widespread attention due to the political clout

of the pacifist movement during the l920 1 s-30 1 s, and the public
support for military disarmament.

Finally, several other events-

18

including Capta�n Caste's airplane flight from Paris to New
York and Governor Roosevelt's reported interest in the Presi
dential nomination- rounded out the basic coverage given to
domestic matters by the American press.7 However, this is not
to imply the German election went entirely unnoticed, as the
following analysis will indicate.
The New York Times provided the most thorough and accurate
analysis of the Reichstag Election held in 1930. A full week
before the election, its editorials predicted tremendous gains
by extremist factions in the Reichstag, though the moderates were
expected to retain control.

11

In the Reichstag election of Sunday

week it seems likely that the diehard parties at either end, the
Communists and Fascists, may make some gains. But a decisive
majority of the German people continues to stand for (law and)
order... (Thus) it is not unreasonable to expect a working majority
...made up of a coalition of middle parties. 118 Furthermore, the
foreign correspondent for the Times, Guido Enderis, reported in
an article appearing September 12th that although general specu
lation tended to concede 'liberal gains' to the Fascists, German

7
This information was derived through a sampling �f the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
8

"The Reichstag Campaign," New York Times, 6 September
1930, p. 14.
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officials were more optomistic and believed the moderates could
retain control.9 After the election results were determined,
the Times offered four editorials and six articles concerning
the outcome, in addition to stories attributed to the Associated
Press. One of the editorials offered on September 16th noted
that while the election produced the predicted extremist gains,
it fell 'noticeably short' of a complete disaster for the
moderates. The increase in Nazi delegates was attributed to a
realignment of the ultra-conservative elements within the country
itself.1 Following this pronouncement, one of the most prophetic

°

comments about the whole matter was offered in the editorial of
September 21st, which stated:

"If some years back, when (Hitler)

was arrested for directing the ill-fated Lundendorff Putsch, the
German authorities had expelled him to his native land, instead
of imprisoning him and making him a martyr, they would have
avoided a mistake which they have not been the first to make. 1111
On the eve of the election itself, the Chicago Tribune
carried a front-page article which accurately forecast the Fascist

9

Guido Enderis, 11 Moderate·coalition Looked For In Reich,"
New �ark Times, 12 September 1930, pp. 1-2. See Appendix A.
10

"The German Elections," New York Times, 16 September
1930, p. 26.
11

Edwin L. James, "Extremes Are Far Apart, 11 New York Times,
21 September 1930, sec. 3, p. 3. See Appendix A.
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gains and the failure of the current regime to obtain a working
majority. As its foreign correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, reported:
"Political prophets held no hope of a majority for Chancellor
Heinrich Bruening's.•.republic.

The...campaign leads observors

to predict a big increase in Fascist seats....While specific
issues grip the voters, the fundamental issue at stake is a battle
between the Communists and Adolf Hitler's Fascists... (and) between
them stands the moderate bourgeoisie. 1112 Later editorials went
on to stress the importance of the election, while advising the
general public to take heart in what it termed a 'temporary
phenomenon. 1

11 Interpreation

of...the German election is at this

distance extra hazardous. What it means to Germany, to Europe
and to the world must wait upon events.... But for Germany we con
tinue to have faith in republicanism. The Germans are the most
stable and orderly people of the continent.... If any people in
the world are fit for self-government and popular institutions,
they are. 1113
The Rocky Mountain News, while exceedingly limited in its
coverage of this matter, showed considerable insight when it
attributed the loss of support for the government to its inability

12

Sigrid Schultz, "Germans Vote Today: l Slain, 8 Dying
in Riot, 11 Chicago Tribune. 14 September 1930, p. l. See Appendix A.
13

p. 14.

"The German Election," Chicago Tribune, 16 September 1930,
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to halt the spread of hunger and unemployment. In addition, it
pointed to the growing doubts concerning Hitler's sanity, and
described the leader of the Fascists as one who is 11irresponsible
(and) unscrupulous.•.. (and) hates to the point of madness anyone
resembling a Socialist... (or) Liberal.1114
Several of the remaining papers in this study drew various
conclusions about the results of the election, but most failed
either to anticipate or appreciate its significance. The Washing
ton Post, for instance, did not appear overly worried about the
recent results. In response to observors who were suggesting the
disintegration of the German Republic, it replied in its editorial
of September 15th: 11The nature of the radicals' gains suggests
they are temporary...and the moderate parties can keep Germany
headed in the right direction if they lay (their) petty rivalries
aside. 1115 Yet as the accompanying editorial cartoon illustrates,
there was some doubt as to the direction in which the Republic was
going- particularly in view of the current internal rivalry among
the various political factions and the 'grip' the Fascists now
had over the country.16

14

"Rumblings of War From Germany,11 Rocky Mountain News,
17 September 1930, p. 6.
15

"The German Elections,11 Washington Post, 15 September
1930, p. 5.
16
James North, 11Too Many Political Links," Washington Post,
17 September 1930, p. 6. See Appendix A.
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The Atlanta Constitution concurred in this analysis,
and credited much of Hitler's success to his 'silver-tongued
·
• 17
Oratory I and ' un 1 1m1
· · ted w,· 11 1ngness
·
to make reckless promises.
·
While citing the ominous overtones of the election results, the
Constitution neverthe1ess endorsed the abi1ity of the moderates ·.to
Their

regain control of the government in the period ahead.

foreign correspondent, Frederick Kuh, quoted one government source
as saying:

"Despite the election results I do not for a moment

perceive a menance to the republican constitution, the public
safety or the foreign policy.

It is absolutely out of the question

that the radical parties that emerged victors at the polls should
be given a chance to try out their recipes for government.

1118

The Los Angeles Times regarded this event as merely a
consequence of too many parties vieing for power simultaneously.
It believed this condition was brought about by the government's
attempt to continue to meet the reparations schedule, predominantly
through fiscal cuts and a drastic increase in taxes.

The Times

noted that this policy was extremely unpopular among the people,
and a mood for 'change' was created throughout Germany.

Numerous

political factions arose in response, each of them hoping to achieve
a significant backing.

17

"The radical parties are only agreed upon

11

Henry K. Norton, "The Background of Foreign Affairs,
Atlanta Constitution, 21 September 1930, p. 12. See Appendix A.
18

Frederick Kuh, "German Leaders Will Bar Fascists From
Cabinet," Atlanta Constitution, 16 September 1930, pp. 1 & 4.
See Appendix A.

23

one point, opposition to the government, and it seems impossible
that they will be able to form a coalition ministry with no
better rallying point than this.1119
The Richmond Times-Dispatch offered a similar interpre
tation, though on a far more simple level.

In its editorial of

September 17th, the Times-Dispatch attributed the latest Fascist
gain to what it termed merely a 'matter of taxation.•

Feeling

that one guess was probably as good as another in terms of explain
ing the recent election results in Germany, the following supposition
was offered:

11

The problem is not a very complex one of statecraft

or international diplomacy. It is very simple. The German of
twenty-two, say, who was a lad of six when the war started and only
ten when it ended, cannot marry the girl of his choice because so
much of his earnings.•.go to... indemnity. Any alternative would
be preferable to this condition of slavery.11 2 0
Of the two remaining papers, the Dallas Morning News seemed
more preoccupied with the potential changes in government structure
(i.e. realignment of the Cabinet and the possibility that Chancellor
Bruening would govern without Parliament) that might occur, instead
of the change in attitude that had already been demonstrated by the
German people.

"The next few days will be deeply important in

Can a new Cabinet be formed, able to control a real

Germany.

19
"Too Many Parties," Los Angeles_ Times, 16 September 1930,
sec. 2 , p. 4.
20

"A Matter of Taxation," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 17 September 1930, p. 8.
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majority in the Reichstag, or will the turmoil of clashing
parties drive Germany also into the list of modern dictator
ships?1121
Finally the Minneapolis Tribune devoted only a minimal
amount of attention to the election; with the exception of one
or two articles by the Associated Press, it ignored the develop
ments abroad and strictly concentrated on domestic and local
issues.

Within the next several years the Tribune would expand

its coverage of the events in Germany, but for now it made little
or no effort to enlighten its readers on this matter.
Hitler's increasing strength in the Reichstag election
was thus greeted with mixed reaction by the American press.
Although the journalists concurred in their findings that the Nazi
gains were unfortunate, they formed no consensus about the implica
tions to be drawn from this election.

Furthermore, only four of

the papers within this survey offered extensive coverage of this
event (See Appendix B), and the Chicago Tribune and New York Times
were the only ones which correctly anticipated the extremist
victory.
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"The German Election, 11 Da11 as Marning News, 16 September
1930, p. 14-
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James :�orth, "Too Many Political Links," \·Jashington
Post, 17 September 1930, p. 6.
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Chapter Two
THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
March - April 1932
Narrative
of ~----~
Events
------- .. -After dramatically bursting upon the national scene iri
-1930, Hitler and the National Socialist Party sought to consoli
date their power and make further efforts to entrench themselves
within the political system. While there were many challenging
problems still ahead, none was to prove any more pivotal than
the Presidential election of 1932. As the level of unemployment
spiraled to an incredible 6 million workers (25 percent), the
general misery of the people provided Hitler with the opportunity
to seek to remove the legendary Hindenburg. The Fuhrer did not
make this decision easily; should he lose, the Party's image of
invincibility could be permanently shattered.

But once committed,

Hitler threw himself wholeheartedly into the race for the Presi
dency as simply a 'risk that must be taken.11
There were four principal candidates vying for power in
this election. Field Marshall van Hindenburg, Protestant,
Prussian, and conservative, garnered most of his support from the
Socialists, trade unions, and various elements of Bruning 1 s Centre

William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 157.
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Party and the liberal democratic factions. Adolf Hitler,
Austrian and Catholic by birth, enjoyed the backing of the
Junker agrarians and a number of monarchists, in addition to
the support of his own followers and the lower-to-middle classes.
Theodor Duesterberg represented the Nationalist Party and had
little support outside it; Ernst Thaelmann, the Communist
candidate, competed with Hitler for the votes of the lower
_classes and the unemployed.2
Almost instantly the Nazis embarked upon a propaganda
campaign that was unlike anything ever witnessed before in
Germany. Financially secure with the newly acquired backing of
numerous industrialists and extremely well organized, the Hitler
campaign was a veritable blitzkreig that rolled over Germany.
Hitler and some of his most emphatic speakers set out across
the country to whip up the fever of a downtrodden people.

Soon

whole cities and towns seemed to be plastered with the bright red
coloring of the Nazi emblems and symbols. Thousands of phonograph
records could be heard spouting their slogans, and theatre owners
were pressured into showing Nazi movies before the regular features.
Nearly eight million pamphlets were distributed, and an additional
twelve million copies of the Party newspaper were also circulated.
Over three thousand meetings were staged each day, and swarms of

2

Ibid.
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s�s. units could be seen streaming through the streets behind
vehicles equipped with loudspeakers to pronounce the National
Socialist philosophy. It was what the propaganda minister, Dr.
3
Joseph Goebbels, called a "war of posters and banners.11
Hitler employed all of his demagogic gifts in one
supreme effort to reach the pinnacle of power within Gennany;
only the aged Hindenburg and his Chancellor, Heinrich Bruning,
-·remained in his way.

Hitler underestimated the resolve of the

Chancellor, however, who launched an effective campaign of his
own to win re-election for the President.

He proved astute and

ruthless enough to reserve all radio time on the government
controlled networks to combat the Nazi barrage of verbal assaults.
Hindenburg himself made only one speech, but obviously it had a
far greater impact on a captive audience.
When the results were finally tabulated from the March
13th election, the Nazis were dealt a severe setback. Hindenburg
had achieved an impressive plurality, with his 49.6 percent of
the vote compared to Hitler 1 s 30.l percent. The Conservative
Duesterberg received a meager 6.8 percent, and the Communist
Thaelmann garnered only 13.2 percent of the total. Because
Hindenburg had fallen short of the required majority, however,
another election had to be held to determine a conclusive winner.

Fest, Hitler, p. 318.
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While most in the Nazi party were dejected by the
outcome, Hitler immediately threw himself back into the thick
of things, proclaiming:

"The first election campaign is over.
The second has begun today. I shall lead it. 114 Since a manda
tory truce on all the electioneering had been declared until
April 3rd, Hitler chartered a plane to make maximum use of the
time that was left. At numerous rallies in cities throughout
.. the country, the slogan 11 Hitler over Germany 11 became the cry,
reinforcing the implied link between the Nazi leader and the
Omnipotent.5
But the results on April 10th confirmed the simple
reality that Hitler did not have the support among the general
populace that his fanatical followers themselves supplied.
Hindenburg captured a decisive 53 percent of the vote, while
Hitler could only manage a respectable 36.8 percent. The majority
he so desperately wanted still eluded him, though in the course
of just two short years he had more than doubled the strength of
the Nazi party.

Now both the Republic and the Party found them

selves at a pivotal point in their development and only time
would tell which would succeed in the years ahead.

**********

4

------

Shirer, Rise & Fall of the Third Reich, p. 158.

5

Bullock, Hitler, p. 105.
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Editorial Analysis
The German election of 1932 commanded attention in the
media throughout the world as a classic struggle between the
forces of left and right developed.

Yet again the domestic

events occurring in this country dominated the newspaper headlines.
One of these incidents in particula�, the kidnapping of the
Lindbergh baby, dwarfed all other news items during this interval.
- As the drama continued to unfold, the papers inundated their
readership with assorted angles and details of this tragedy.
Prohibition also resurfaced on the front-page, as the House of
Representatives passed a bill legalizing beer, while rejecting a
similar proposal to allow the individual states to regulate the
sales of liquor.6
In regards to the coverage rendered by the American press
on the recent German election, their interpretation of the final
results showed remarkable variety.

One particular segment viewed

the continued rise in popular support for Hitler as a sign of his
growing strength, while another regarded the Hindenburg victory
as a symbol in itself of the return to conservatism.

A third

category of opinion appeared to be indifferent to the entire
matter, drawing little significance from the election in either
direction.

------------

This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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Only two of the papers within this study correctly
judged that the returns from this election could hardly be
interpreted to mean an end to Hitler's career, despite his
obvious failure in the bid for the Presidency. One of the two,
the Rocky Mountain News, was quick to point out that Hitler
actually received twice as many votes in this election as he
had two years earlier.

11

Considering the near mythical awe in

which the aged van Hindenburg is held by the German people...
the 49.6 percent of the voters supporting the government is a
very small margin of safety for the republic. 11 Furthermore,
a continuation of this trend would eventually allow the Nazis
to assume power peacefully. Thus Germany had escaped revolu
tion only by precariously balancing itself between the Fascist
and Cormnunist parties.7 A subsequent editorial went on to
speculate:

"Unless America, Britain, and France permit a

reparations-waf debts settlement and a tariff-trade readjust
ment allowing the German Republic to live, the German people
doubtless will turn to Hitler and his militarist for self
preservation.118
Along a similar vein, the Dallas Morning News captured
the real dilemma facing the German voter in this election in

Toward German Chaos, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 16 March
1932, p. 6.
• 11

8

p. 4.

11

German Fascists, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 13 April 1932,
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deciding the direction which the country should take through
its editorial cartoon of March 13th (attached, p. 38).9 The
results clearly revealed the National Socialists had scored an
'amazing' victory at the polls and could expect growing support
in the future. Hitler's loss to Hindenburg meant the "Republic
has merely postponed coming to grips with the Nazis.1110 While
this analysis of the situation in Germany may appear almost super
ficial, it contrasts sharply with the more common editorial opinion
which tolled the death knoll for Nazism. Certainly not everyone
was convinced that the 'threat' was over and that Europe could
once again feel at rest- as the question mark in the editorial
cartoon of April 12th would indicate (attached, p. 39).11
Many of the papers, however, shared the belief that the
German Republic was safe again in the hands of the moderates.
The Atlanta Constitution, for instance, regarded the Hindenburg
victory as a decisive indication that "the German scales are
(finally) balancing to a safe and sane basis...emphasizing the

John Knott, "The Language of Whiskers, 11 Da11as Marning
News, 13 March 1932, sec. 3, p. 10. See Appendix A.
9

10

"Germany Looks Ahead," Dallas Morning News, 15 March
1932, sec. 2, p. 6.
11

John Knott, "Going Down for the Last Time?," Dallas
Morning News, 12 April 1932, sec. 2, p. 2.
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fact that not only Germany but all of Europe is getting back to
a conservative b�sis.11 12 A later editorial went on to note that
the Gennan people have 'refused to be swept off their feet' by
Hitler and National Socialism, thus accounting for their verdict
at the polls. 13
The Chicago Tribune concurred in these observations, and
further surmised:

11Hitlerism will continue to be a disturbing

factor, no doubt, but at least to outside observation, it does not
seem to be a force likely to grow (in the future).11

Moreover,

with an increasing sense of cooperation among the European com
munity-particularly on the issue of reparations- the prospects of
both stability and recovery in Germany appear bright.14 This
conjecture by the Tribune would, in effect, mean that one of
Hitler's chief weapons- the general discontent of the people
would be removed.
The Washington Post was even more confident that Hitler
had at last made a fatal error. In its editorial of March 1st it

12

11The German Election, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 15 March
1932, p. 8.
13

"Hindenburg Wins Again, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 12 April
1932, p. 6.
14
p. 12.

"The German Election, 11 Chicago Tribune, 15 March 1932,
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stated:

11

In allowing himself to be drawn into the presidential

race Adolf Hitler made the greatest mistake of his career. He
will be hopelessly defeated, and the prestige of his party in the
Reichstag will doubtless undergo a considerable shrinkage ....
Germany may owe her salvation to the fate which drove the leader
of the Nazis into (this) campaign. 11

1

5

A subsequent editorial

went on to stress that National Socialism was never a constructive
-ideology in the truest sense of the word; rather Hitlerism was an
'emotional expression of resentment' derived from the injustices
imposed at Versailles. Thus Hitler's recent defeat at the polls
confirmed that reason and common sense still prevailed in Germany. 1
The New York Times concurred with this position, and
pointed out that the 11 main argument for (the) fair treatment of
Germany••. is that the German people must not be driven into the
arms of Hitler. 11

1

7

Realizing the Allies were at lea_st partially

to blame for the current malady in Germany, the Times correspondent,
Edwin James, noted the Republic was at a 'crossroads.• 1 8 Yet with

15

16
17

p. l.
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Hindenburg Or Chaos, 11 Washington Post, l March 1 932, p. 6.

11

A Rational Germany, 11 Washington Post, 14 March 1932, p. 6.

11

world Revolution, 11 New York Times, 6 March 1932, sec.

Edwin L. James, 11 Germany Votes Today, 11 New York Times,
1 3 March 1 932, sec. 3, p. 3.
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the eventual defeat of Hitler in the election, the Times
editorial of April 11th concluded: "(The Republic) under the
auspices of President Hindenburg...and with the determination
of the German people behind the Bruening Government, there can
be little doubt that German internal questions will be dealt
with successfully. 1119
The Richmond Times-Dispatch was equally optomistic about
-the situation and cavalierly dismissed the entire Nazi threat as
more vocal than actual in nature.

11

To the rest of the world,

the election should be a warning not to heed too much the propa
ganda of radicalism.... In America we are too frequently led to
misjudge the strength of popular trends by the noise of agitators
who do not represent the sound sense of the body politic.1120
The Minneapolis Tribune, on the other hand, vacilated
in its prediction of the course which Germany and National
Socialism would take. In one editorial just prior to the election
it had suggested National Socialism was inevitable; even if Hitler
were defeated in his quest for the presidency, the dream would
continue. "The German electorate may reject Adolf Hitler in the
first balloting of their presidential election today, but they
cannot, by virtue of their ballots, defeat Hitlerism.... For it is

p. 14.

19
"Germany Stands Fast, 11 New York Times, ll April 1932,

20
"The German Election," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 15 March
1932, p. 8.
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founded on what is the dream and the hope of a large part of
the German peop.le. 1121

Ironically, however, a few days later

after the election, the Tribune boldly proclaimed that the
voters had emphatically rejected both Hitler and Fascism.
11 Looked

to all over the world as a serious test of the German

republic, this election was a more convincing rejection of
Fascism, as it was represented by Adolf Hitler, than had been
-looked for by any one. 1122 This drastic shift in position by the
Tribune, within only a two day period, seems difficult to under
stand even in retrospect.
The final paper in this survey, the Los Angeles Times,
deserves a category all its own since it presented an opinion
quite different from the others.

The Times, which gave meager

coverage to the election itself, judged the issue of Nazi violence
during the campaign as hardly more serious than the episodes which
occurred in a typical American city like Chicago.

In fact, the

Times went on to say that 11it may be that (the) Nazi violence is
being exaggerated."23

21

11 Germany Weighs Hitler, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 13 March
1932, sec. ?, p. 3.
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p. 8.

"The Hindenburg, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 15 March 1932,

23
"Germany Campaigns, 11 Los Angeles Times, 5 April 1932,
sec. 2, p. 4.
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To summ�rize the coverage rendered by the American press
on these latest developments, the growing disparity of opinion
needs to be reiterated.

Furthermore, despite the fact that the

papers in this study greatly increased the amount of coverage
they offered to their readers (see Appendix B), only the Dallas
Morning News and Rocky Mountain News accurately interpreted the
results.
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Chapter Three
THE CHANCELLORSHIP
January - February 1933
Narrative of Events
The Nazi campaign in 1932 strongly emphasized that
-destiny had preordained their eventual assumption of power.
This proposition was seriously undermined by the defeats they
suffered in both the presidential and parliamentary elections
of that year.

The Party and its leader ultimately owed much

of their success to the lack of nerve and action by their
opponents. · In the November election to the Reichstag, the
people of Germany displayed their disillusionment with the Nazi
myth when they cast 2 million fewer votes for the Party than
they had in the earlier April contest.

The Nazis lost 34 seats

in the Reichstag, their first setback in over two years.

The

'march to victory' appeared to be losing its momentum, but
Hitler still refused to consider any overtures from the govern
ment.

Thus the Chancellor was left with only two viable alter

natives, to dissolve the Reichstag or revise the constitution.
As van Papen laid plans to use both presidential and
military powers to ban opposing political parties like the Nazis
and Communists, his untrustworthy ally, General Kurt van Sch
leicher, began negotiations of his own with the National

1
Socialists to fo�m a government under his personal control.
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On November 17th, von Papen, acting on the General's advice,
resigned from the Chancellorship in order to expedite talks
between Hindenburg and the Nazi leaders directly.

When, as he

anticipated, these discussions ended in failure, von Papen
expected to be recalled to office in order to implement his
bold program of constitutional reform and virtual dictatorial
rule. He was distressed to find that the Wiley von Schleicher
had persuaded the aged Hindenburg that the only chance to avoid
a civil war was to name him Chancellor, which he did on December
2nd.
While van Papen and Schleicher were embroiled in their
continuous plots, the Nazi Party itself seemed headed towards an
all time low. The disappointments at the polls had bred dis
content among the rank and file members, and the exorbitant
campaigns had depleted their treasury.2 This situation was
further exacerbated when the dynamic Gregor Strasser resigned
from the Party in a dispute over the direction in which it was
headed. Suddenly the entire upper echelon was thrown into
turmoil and Hitler once again acted to grasp victory out of
defeat. Swiftly he began to tighten his control over the entire

Fest, Hitler, pp. 349-50.
2

Ibid., p. 352.
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organization and to embark upon a national campaign to restore
his followers' faith in the Nazi ideology.
Meanwhile the van Schleicher government was experiencing
serious difficulties, failing to achieve the support it had
anticipated from assorted political factions.

The concessions

made to labor were insufficient to earn the backing of the Social
Democrats, and the Catholic Centre was too concerned about retaining
- its own power to worry about the problems of others.

The powerful

landlords of the east were alienated by the government's continuing
investigation into fraudulent use of land subsidies, and the Com
munists were screaming they would rather see the Nazis in control
than lift a single finger in defense of the Republic.3
But ultimately it was a single man, the ex-Chancellor von
Papen, who played the decisive role in bringing down von Sch
leicher's government.

Having set his mind on revenge, Papen

approached Hitler with a proposed coalition between the German
Right and the National Socialists, jointly headed by the two men.
Hitler unflinchingly demanded the Chancellorship and von Papen
agreed, but only after Hitler promiied to strengthen the office of
the Vice-Chancellor which would fall to van Papen. These addi
tional powers led Papen to believe he would still retain the
control of the government and that Hitler could be easily contained.
Using persuasive arguments with the aged Field Marshall, threats
to his son, and intimidation towards everyone else, the two

Bullock, Hitler, p. 138.
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politicians fin�lly gained for Hitler his foremost aim, the
legal assumption of power.4 Now Hitler could proceed to make
radical changes upon the state, entirely with its approval,
even if it resulted in its eventual destruction-and that was
precisely his intent!
* * * * * * * * * *
Editorial Analysis
While the significance of Hitler's appointment to the
Chancellorship in 1933 drew widespread attention, American news
papers were generally preoccupied with the various reform measures
being considered by President-elect Franklin Roosevelt. Most of
these proposals were concerned with getting the economy back on
its feet, including the devaluation of gold and a new war debts
settlement.

A bankruptcy reform bill also passed Congress, and a

huge development project to put 200,000 people back to work was
suggested for the Tennessee Valley.5
In regards to the coverage given to Hitler's newly acquired
position, there seemed to be a prevailing skepticism among the
editorial opinions as to whether or not the conservatives in

4
5

Third Reich, p. 187.
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This information was dervied through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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Germany could retain control and keep the National Socialists
in check. The achievement of what Hitler had termed the 'legal'
revolution was largely ignored, and most of the papers in this
survey seemed unable to explain either the success or the direction
of Hitler and Germany. The number of editorials written on this
event was surprisingly small, though the readers were inundated
with articles from the Associated Press, which reported a detailed
_narrative of the events.
Several of the papers included in this study took a
pessimistic approach to this latest development in Germany. The
Chicago Tribune regarded Hitler's ascendancy with grave reserva
tions, feeling it presented a danger still to be reckoned with.
"The demonstrations grew to riotous proportions in many cities
when inhabitants...showed their resentment to Hitler's regime....
It was evident that Hitler's ascendancy (has} sharply divided the
nation. 116 The Dallas Morning News was even more bleak in its
outlook, stating that Germany was definitely 'swinging' towards
a dictatorship. 7 Furthermore, unless a working majority could be
obtained in the Reichstag, its repeated dissolution seemed inevit-

\;grid Schultz, "Rule of Hitler Is Opened With Riots 4 Slain," Chicago Tribune, l February 1933, p. 1.
7

Joseph Willets, "The World in Review - Germany," Dallas
Morning News, 29 January 1933, sec. 3, p. rn. See Appendix A.
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able and a continuation of 11 the virtual dictatorship of the
Hitler ministry11 unavoidable.8
The Minneapolis Tribune expressed the belief that it
would be impossible to predict the outcome of this latest political
jostling, though it did consider this event an important test for
Hitler. ln its editorial of January 31st, the Tribune stated that
Hitler's recent appointment to the Chancellorship may indeed hold
-the 'key' to his future career in politics.

1

1Although the rise

of the Nazi movement has been rapid, the personal influence of
Hitler is said to be on the wane ....Whether the present episode
means the beginning of the end for Adolf Hitler personally, or
whether it will enable him to climb (even) higher, remains to be
seen.11 9
The New York Times and Washington Post were more guarded
in their assessment of the·recent developments in Germany. In
an article by the Times correspondent Guido Enderis appearing on
January 29th, the possibility of a government under the leadership
of Hitler was mentioned as only one of several options still avail
able to Hindenburg at this time.10 On the day following Hitler's

8

11German Election," Dallas Morning News, 3 February 1933,
sec. 2, p. 2.
9

Hindenburg and Hitler, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 31 January
1933, p. 10.
11

10
1
1
Guido Enderis, 1Schleicher Quits As Cabinet Head,1
New York Times, 29 January 1933, pp. 1-2.
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appointment, however, the Times editorial conceded that Germany
had now embarked upon a 'perilous adventure.'

11

(Yet) anxiety

will not be relaxed nor vigilance abated so long as it is uncertain
whether the new Chancellor...is going to urge and seek the...people

of Germany to take a leap into the dark.1111 The Washington Post

was equally realistic when it concluded that there was slim hope
for either political or economic stability in Germany until Hitler
was given a trial. "There is every reason to hope that this government will be given a chance to rule, for, whether there is agreement
with his policies or not, there is little (possibility) for a
restoration of political peace and orderly economic recovery

until (this regime) has been given a trial. 11 12 Yet the foreboding

. question which the Post ultimately left for its readers to decide
was "what aspirations...have been kindled and powers (set) loose by
the Hitler ascendancy? 1113 Only time would tell.
A few of the papers included in this survey were actually
optomistic about the situation now unfolding. The Atlanta Consti
tution informed its readers that there was little to fear from
Hitler. "It is (far) more likely that, having achieved power, he
will adopt a middle course in the effort to enlist strength from

11
12

p. 6.

"Germany Ventures," New York Times, 31 January 1933, p. 16.
11
"Chancellor Hitler, Washington Post, 31 January 1933, p. 6.

13
11
"Another German Election, Washington Post, 5 February 1933,

both radicals and conservatives (alike).1114 Moreover, the
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Constitution went on to add in its editorial a few days later
that it did not consider many of Germany's demands (i.e. parti
cularly on the issue of increasing her military strength and
capability) to be unreasonable.15
The Richmond Times-Dispatch concurred in this belief
that Hitler's 'wings have been clipped', and he could easily be
brought to his knees if his policies proved unsatisfactory. A
battered Germany might be willing to give Hitler a try (see the
editorial cartoon of February 4th attached - p. 50), but:
"German labor is ready to declare a general strike...the Communists
are in open rebellion ...a majority of the Cabinet (which Hitler)
has been forced to accept (is) ready to curb him to preser.ve the
national finances •.. (and) Hindenburg, who named Hitler Chancellor,
can as quickly unmake him.11 16 With all these restrains taken
into consideration, there seems to be ample reason for the Times
Dispatch's positive position. The paper likewise noted, as
ingeniously depicted in an editorial cartoon carried February 1st,

14

"The New PreinieY.:s,11 Atlanta Constitution, 31 January
1933, p. 4.
15

"Germany on Arms, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 2 February
1933, p. 6.
16

"Hitler Takes the Reins,11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
1 February 1933, p. 6.

48

that Hitler was.in reality little more than a poor imitation
17
of two truly powerful men in Europe, Stalin and Mussolini.
Hitlerism was simply much bigger than Hitler; and for Germany to
be brought 11 under his heel, it would require more iron than (we)
believe is in his system. 1118
The remaining two papers, the Los Angeles Times and the
Rocky Mountain News, devoted the least editorial space to this
latest news from Germany.

Each of these major publications limited

their analysis and interpretation of Hitler's appointment to a
single editorial. The Times seemed convinced that the Junkers had
allowed Hitler this opportunity to run the government in order to
provide him with a chance to cut his own throat.

"The Junker

politicians believe the only way to squelch this upstart.is to
let him kill himself trying to run the government. They will then
argue that events of several years have demonstrated the impossi
bility of parliamentary government in Germany, and end the whole
affair with a coup d'etat. 11 19 The Rocky Mountain News expressed

17

Fred Seibel, 11 Hitler: Two In One, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
l February 1933, p. 6. See Appendix A.
18

11

1933, p. 8.
19

Hitler: Two In One, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February

Hitler Takes Power, 11 Los Angeles Times, 31 January 1933,
sec. 2, p. 4.
11
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a similar view �hat Hitler was more of an imagined, than real,
threat to peace- yet it also noted that the Allies were
partially to blame for this malady by their injustice at
Versaille to Germany. "Hitler is not the cause of anything;
20
he is merely a symptom-a dangerous symptom.11
As the drama continued to unfold, the American press was
starting to hedge more and more in its predictions of the direction
in which the Fuhrer was leading Germany and the rest of Europe.
This, in turn, created a natural disparity in editorial opinion,
which provides one of the major focal points of this study.

20

1 o.

"Herr Hitler," Rocky Mountain News, l February .1933, p.

50

Fred Seibel, Taking on the Pilot, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
4 February 1933, p. 6.
11

1
1
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Chapter Four
THE REICHSTAG FIRE AND AFTERMATH
February - March 1933
Narrative of Events
Hitler's strategy of seeking a legal revolution eventually
paid off handsomely when he assumed the office of Chancellor on
January 30, 1933, and at last found himself in the position to
put his plans into action.

His first major objective was to

neutralize any potential opponent who might seriously challenge
his control of the government or the direction in which he was
leading the state. Since the combined backing of the Nazis and
Nationalists failed to afford him the majority he needed in the
Reichstag, he knew this situation would have to be remedied.

The

Communist Party, which held 100 seats in the parliamentary body,
became Hitler's target; if somehow they could be eliminated, he
would finally have the majority which had so long eluded him.
New elections were set for March 5th, and for once the
Nazis had all the resources of the state behind them in order to
recruit voters.

They intended to win a mandate from the people.

Unofficially most of the Nazi leaders hoped the Communists would
cause a flare up which would enable them to move against them.
As Goebbels candidly remarked: "We (will) lay down the line for
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the fight again�t the Red Terror.

For the moment we shall

abstain from direct counter-measures. The Bolshevik attempt
at revolution must first burst into flame.

(Then) at the proper

moment we wi11 strike. 111
Despite ample provocations, the Communists refused to
act, and so the Nazis took the offen�ive, beginning with a raid
upon the Communist headquarters in Berlin. The tremendous amount
of propaganda material they discovered gave rise to charges that
an insurrection was being planned; this in turn caused more rumors
to spread throughout the country.

The mood was exactly right for

the next provocation, none other than the firing of the Reichstag.
It was the night of February 27th when a bright glow
appeared over the city, directly above the Reichstag; even before
the flames were extinguished, the Nazi leaders had already accused
the Communists of arson. Though the exact circumstances surround
ing this event have never been completely unraveled, a pathetic
half-witted Dutchman by the name of van der Lubbe was promptly
arrested and charged with the offense.

Exploiting his ties to the

Communist Party, the Nazis quickly attacked their rivals of the
extreme Left; several of the leading communist officials were
arrested and held indefinitely in 'protective' custody, while a
ban on all their publications was strictly enforced.

Rise & Fall of the Third Reich, p. 190.
\hirer, ---
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On the following day, February 28th, Hitler prevailed
upon von Hindenburg to sign a special emergency decree that
would allow him to proceed against those presenting a direct
threat to the state. This single act suspended many individual
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, curtailing freedom
of expression and assembly, permitting censorship of mail and
other communications, suspending the need for warrants to conduct
searches of private homes, and allowing the confiscation and
restriction of private property.2 Furthermore, this decree allowed
the Reich government to assume full authority in any federal state
when necessary and to institute the death penalty as a deterent to
serious crimes. Hitler now had the legal power to destroy any
opposition that might confront him, without fear of retribution.
This decree provided the legal foundation upon which the Nazi
regime was based, and simultaneously resulted in the end of the
Republic.
The last democratic elections were held on March 5th, and
the majority of German people still withheld their support of
Hitler and the Nazi ideals.

The final breakdown of the voting re

vealed the National Socialists had won 43.9 percent, and in conjunc
tion with the Nationalists, now held a scant 51.9 percent majority.
This was hardly the resounding victory that had been anticipated,

Bullock, Hitler, p. 145.
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particularly in light of all the pressures and schemes Hitler
and his associates had employed.

Yet this last barrier was

overcome with the passage of the Enabling Act on March 24th, by
which the Reichstag delegated its legislative power to Hitler.
The fate of Germany was now grasped firmly in the hands of their
new Chancellor for the dozen years that the 'thousand-year Reich'
would stand.

******

*

***

Editorial Analysis
As the last remnants of democracy were being stripped
away from the German nation, journalists seemed bewildered to
explain the spectacle.

The press remained absorbed by the domestic

issues of this country, particularly President Roosevelt's inaugu
ration and first hundred days of office.

A four day bank holiday

was declared during this period in order to reorganize the fin
ancial system, and am embargo on gold was implemented.

Little

attention was given to news originating from Europe, and the
average American could hardly be expected to piece together an
intelligent picture of German politics from what information was
3
afforded.

3
This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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The burning of the Reichstag provided the excuse and
the opportunity for Hitler to destroy the Communist Party, yet
the significance of these events was overlooked by a number of
papers throughout this country. This is not to suggest that the
fire and its aftermath were totally ignored, but rather that they
were ineptly interpreted and little emphasized.
Four of the papers in this survey refused to accept the
contrived Nazi explanation which allowed them to persecute their
Communist rivals. The Richmond Times-Dispatch regarded this
entire incident as highly political and part of an overall attempt
by the Nazis to bring about a savage civil war.
11

appearing on March 1st, went on to relate:

11

11

This editorial,

It is wholly possible

that the fire started from accidental purposes... (yet) it would
not be to Hitler's advantage to view the conflagration as acci
dental.

It would... be greatly to his advantage (,however, ) to

convince Germany that it was the work of the Communists and that
the country needs a dictator...to save it from radicalism.

11

4

A similar skepticism about this incident was revealed in
the New York Times.

Both its foreign correspondent, Frederick

T. Birchell, and an unidentified editor raised the same question
in two related articles on March 2nd, namely:

4
p. 6.

11

11

What point would

l March 1933,
Richmond Times
orama in Berlin, -------- -Disp
-- atch,
-11
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there be for the Communists to burn down the Reichstag and
invite repression a few days before an election which may
unseat Hitler? 115 Obviously both of these writers suspected the
Nazis were somehow involved in this latest incident. Yet in
response to charges that Hitler and the Nazis were merely employ
ing the same tactics which previous administrations had utilized
against them, the Times succeeded in drawing a major distinction;
11The democratic authorities employed these methods for the de
fense of a constitutional regime against a party which openly ...
(promised) to send heads... rolling.

It was the cause of law and

order in Germany and the preservation of peace in Europe against
a party openly preaching civil and for�ign war (which compelled
the democratic authorities to act).116 This belief was further
illustrated in an editorial cartoon offered on March 26th
(attached, p. 62) depecting the threat of Hitler's militarism to
Germany as well as the rest of the world.7

5

Frederick T. Birchell, 11 Hitler Intensifies Drive On Left;
Hundred Arrested," -----New York Times, 2 March 1933, p. 1. See Appendix A.
11
New York Times, 2
11 Topics of The Times-Caesar or Nerves?
March 1933, p. 11.
6

"Topics of The Times-Reprisal or Repression, 11 New York
Times, 4 March 1933, p. 12.
7

11

The Misfit, 11 New York Times, 26 March 1933, sec. 4, p. 5.
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Both the Atlanta Constitution and the Chicago Tribune
shared the opinion that the National Socialists were ultimately
behind this deed, but they went on to add a unique twist of their
own to their respective interpretations.

Initially the Consti

tution openly questioned to what extent Hitler 1 s political
program would ever be implemented, •except for the killings and
ambushing• of his opponents? 8 Yet strangely a few days later it
went on to say that Hitler 1 s victory would allow 11 Fascist control
of Germany (to) stabilize and strengthen (the) economic and
political conditions on the continent.119 Along this same idea,
the Tribune went so far as to defend the Nazis, comparing their
reprisals to similar action taken by the English, French, and
Americans following their own revolutions.

11

It is theoretically

.•. (Hitler 1 s) objective to unite Germany, to free it from the
limitations imposed by an unjust treaty, and to give it the place
to which its natural power and accomplishment would entitle it.
Much of this assumes the sympathy of the rest of the Western
1

World. 11 ° Certainly both of these papers were in the minority in
the expression of confidence and optomism which they accorded to
Hitler and the Nazi regime.

8

p. lOA.

9

11

Whither Germany,S 1 Atlanta Constitution, 5 March 1933,

11

Hitler 1 s Victory,S 1 Atlanta Constitution, 7 March 1933, p. 4.

10

11

Hitlerites Amuck, 11 Chicago Tribune, 21 March 1933, p.

8.
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In contrast to the above opinions, the Dallas Morning
News and the Washington Post supported the Nazi claim that the
fire was a prelude to a Communist uprising.

In its editorial

of March 2nd, the News stated it would be unfair to assume the
current government had actually provoked this incendiary act,
but:

"When any large group (of peop_le) is denied legal freedom

of expression, illegal acts can be expected from its members ...
who see no other means of lodging a protest. 1111

Yet as its

editorial cartoon of March 26th (attached, p. 63) indicated, the
rise of Hitler and other similar dictators was in direct response
to the dire economic and political conditions already existing.12
Thus the 'mother of dictators• was in reality simple necessity!
The Washington Post likewise agreed that the Communists
were behind this deed and expressed relief that a revolution had
been avoided.

11

Germany may have narrowly escaped a violent radical

outbreak that may have plunged the country into civil strife. The
firing of the Reichstag...was said to have been a signal for an
uprising against the constituted authorities, which was only
avoided by the prompt action of the police. 1113 The idea that the

11

Reichstag 1 s Blaze, 11 Dallas Morning News, 2 March 1933,
secJ·2., p. 2.
11

12

11 The Mother of Dictators," Dallas Morning News, 26 March
1933, sec. 3, p. 10.

13
p. 5.

11

1ron Hand In Germany, 11 Washington Post, 2 March 1933,
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Republic could ever be safe under the direction and control of
the Nazis seems ludicrous in hindsight; yet it was the editor's
belief during this time that any uprising against the 'constituted
authorities' was even more repugnant than the actions of the
Hitler regime itself. This same conservative approach was
evidenced in another editorial printed a few days later which
said:

"There has been much criticism of the harsh measures...

employed by Hitler; •..whether justified or not (however) the
results of the election shows that Germany has resolved to give
Hitlerism a trial.1114
Of the several remaining papers in this study, there
appeared to be a general apathy among them concerning both the
fire and the election. The Los Angeles Times, for instance,
simply noted that Hitler had garnered an unimpressive 43.7 percent
of the seats in the Reichstag, and thus faced an uphill battle in
gaining a majority. "Hitler has by no means convinced all the

German people that this scheme is (either) wise or beneficial.1115

The Minneapolis Tribune limited its coverage even further to a few
small articles by the Associated Press and one short editorial,
"There are those who think that a dictator is
the only solution for America.1116 Finally, the Rocky Mountain News

which observed:

14

"Hitler Arrives," Washington Post, 7 March 1933, p. 6.

15

"Hitler's Victory," Los Angeles Times, 7 March 1933,
sec. 2., p. 4.
16

"Terrorism in Germany," Minneapolis Tribune, 3 March
1933, p. l O.
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offered no editorials whatsoever and presented only a minimal
number of articles on the event itself.

Presumably the impact

on this occurrence completely escaped the attention of the
editor as well .as its readers.
To summarize the coverage given to this event, it is
noteworthy that over half of the papers included in this study
either misinterpreted or minimized this increasingly dangerous
phenomena known as Nazism (see Appendix C).

The New York Times

stood alone in its ability to provide extensive and accurate
comnentary on these developments.

Yet this is hardly surprising,

considering the resources which this publication had at its
disposal.
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11

The Misfit," Nevi York Times, 26 March 1933, sec. 4, p. 5.
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11

The Mother of Dictators," Dallas t1orning News, 26 March 1933,
sec. 3, p. 10.
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Chapter Five
THE BLOOD PURGE
June - July 1934
Narrative of Events
The tremendous suffering in Germany that had paved the
path for Hitler's assumption of power in no way diminished simply
because he gained the title of Chancellor in 1933. Rumors of a
'second revolution' continued to spread througout the country,
and the dissension between the regular Army and the Nazi S.A.
1
grew to an alarming level. The Vice-Chancellor, van Papen,
recognized the precarious situation Hitler faced and stood ready
to exploit any opportunity which might present itself to over
throw the current regime.
Given these ominous conditions surrounding his second
year of office, Hitler proceeded with remarkable calm and pre
cision to assuage the fears of those portions of German society
which had to be united if the nation were to become a dominant
force throughout Europe. Knowing he could not afford to ostracize
the entire military caste that had traditionally played such a

l

Shirer, Rise! Fall of the Third Reich, p. 213.
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major role in German politics, Hitler attempted to win the
Army's support by attacking his own allies, namely, Ernst
Roehm and the S.A.2 Corruption and homosexual tendancies in
the S.A. had recently gained considerable attention in the
German press, which in turn caused the Fuhrer some embarrassment.
It became quite clear that if Hitler hoped to eventually replace
the legendary Hindenburg as President, he could not continue to
sanction an organization that offended both the Army and general
citizenry. The time for reorganization of the Party seemed at
hand.
Throughout his discussions with the military high command
during 1933, Hitler displayed a reluctance to move decisively
against the forces that had catapulted him into office.

Rather

than disband the S.A. or incorporate it into the Army, as the
generals demanded, Hitler still believed a more moderate solution
might be discovered which would spare the Party a shocking blow.
By the end of June 1934, however, Hitler had become convinced that
the sacrifice of Roehm and his men in exchange for supreme power
was hardly unreasonable.
This �hange of heart could be directly attributed to the
activities of Goering and Himmler. Both were currently engaged in
a bitter struggle for power within the Party, and each professed

2

Ibid., p. 214.

66
to believe that Roehm was trying to challenge Hitler's authority.
As the rumors of an overthrow continued to mount, Hitler con
fronted the S.A. leader with these allegations in hopes of
reaching an understanding.

Roehm vigorously denied any dis

loyalty, but he agreed to order his men on a general vacation for
the entire month of July. During this period the troops would
not be allowed to wear their uniforms or participate in any public
displays. This was a temporary solution at best, and so the two
men decided to meet later in June, at the town of Wiessee, to
continue their discussions.3
Perhaps Roehm and the S.A. might still have been salvaged
had it not been for von Papen. Taking advantage of Hitler's visit
to Mussolini's Italy in the second week of June, the Vice-Chancellor
delivered a scathing attack on the Nazi regime. Upon learning of
the speech, given at the University of Marburg, Hitler became in
censed and immediately launched a counter-attack on the 1 pygmy 1
who thought he could stem the tide of National Socialism.4
Goebbels had banned any reproduction of the speech within
Germany, and Papen became furious at this blatant form of censor
ship. He demanded that Hitler lift the ban immediately or he
would submit his resignation. This was a move that Hitler had not

3

Bullock, Hitler, p. 161.

4

Fest, Hitler, p. 459.
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counted on, and it clearly worried him since Hindenburg had
threatened to put the entire country under martial law and

hand over power to the Army if 'tensions' were not resolved. 5
When Hitler realized the seriousness of the situation, he decided
to court the Army's support by suppressing the S.A. swiftly and
effectively.
The actual details of the purge were left to the capable
hands of Goering and Himmler, who had compiled a long list of
enemies whom they wished to see eliminated. On June 28th the time
seemed at hand. Hitler left Berlin to attend a wedding at Essen;
the police and S.S. were put on alert, and the following day the
executions began. The exact number of people who fell victim to
this purge has never been definitely established, but Hitler alone
decided the fate of his old cohart, Ernst Roehm. Speeding to the
Hanslbauer Hotel in Wiessee, he confronted the S.A. leader, accused
him of treason and treachery against the regime, and left a gun in
his room so that fate might take its course.
Later that same day Hitler returned to Berlin, where Goering
and Himmler greeted him at the airport and informed him of the events
in greater detail. The killings continued until Sunday, June 30th,
and most of the victims met a death as violent as the life they had
led. The 'blood purge' of 1934 eased the political tensions and won
Hitler the grudging support of the Army. He was finally the undis
puted force in Germany.
* * * * * * * * * *
Bullock, Hitler, p. 164.
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Editorial Analysis
The American press continued to focus sharply on the
economic developments at home during this period as President
Roosevelt attempted to lift the nation out of a depression
through federal regulation and spending.

The Public Works Admin

istration was awarded $25 million for a slum clearance project
in New York, while a special labor board was created to settle
the current long shoreman 1 s strike.

The President reiterated

his support for the 'Brain Trust• he had assembled in Washington,
and a new social program called Social Security was being studied
by the Cabinet.

Joseph P. Kennedy was named chairman of the newly

formed Securities and Exchange Commission, and Senator Borah
launched a campaign against the growing bureaucracy associated
with the New Deal.6
Yet the newspaper media did not ignore the expanding
internal strife occurring in Germany during June of 1934.

The

potentially explosive nature of this situation was recognized by
most of the papers in this country, and no fewer than four of
those being examined in this survey suggested a showdown of some
description was imminent between the government and Nazi party.
The Rocky Mountain News, for example, hinted in its
editorial of June 29th that the recent propaganda efforts by the

This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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National Socialists meant Hitler's regime was at last on the
offensive. Rumblings of discontent could be heard throughout
the country, coming not only from the left, but the right as
we11. 7 11 The future ...of Germany and, to no sma11 degree, the
entire old world is now in the balance.... For Hitler a showdown
is fast approaching. 118 Thus while the impending violence was not
predicted outright, certainly the editorials inferred something
ominous was in the offing.
The Minneapolis Tribune, in its editorial of June 30th,
related a similar feeling of apprehension as the fight between
Hitler's storm troops and the Stahlhelm rose to more intense
levels. It noted that the current political crisis was likely to
come to an early conclusion, though it was undecided whom the
winner would be.9 Additional analysis was provided by an editorial
a few days later, which noted that a man such as Hitler who had
attained power through violent means was himself susceptible to
them.

11

While these methods may succeed in quelling revolts in

(their) initial stages, the regime that uses them admits its one
weakness in doing so. The use of force usually sows the seeds of

7

p. 12.

11

Thunder On The Right, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 29 June 1934,

11

Whither Germany?, 11

8

9

Rocky Mountain News, 3 July 1934, p. 8.

The German Reactionaries, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 30 June
1934, p. 8.
11

70

revolution and it remains to be seen whether Hitler will not
fall victim to his own methods. 1110
Two other publications, the Chicago Tribune and the
Richmond Times-Dispatch, likewise alluded to the impending
violence in Germany.

On June 28th, the Tribune reported that

the rivalry between the Nazi storm troops and the regular Army
was threatening to break into open warfare, and rumors had it

11
that Hitler was leaning more towards the latter in his support.

Then as the details of the purge gradually became known, one of
the Tribune's foreign correspondents- Edmond Taylor- colorfully
summarized the new situation as follows:

11

The Brown Shirts •.•

have vanished overnight from the streets. But the raven black,
silver trimmed uniforms of the Schutz Staffel •..today stand watch
over... Hitler 1 s third reich- the successor to the empire and the
republic.1112
The Richmond Times-Dispatch also recognized the struggle
taking place prior to its actual outbreak, and concluded:

10
p. 4.

11

11

Those

Hitler Cracks Down, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 2 July 1934,

ll

Sigrid Schultz, 11 Storm Troops Attacked, 11 Chicago Tribune,
28 June 1934, p. 13.
12

1
Edmond Taylor, 11 Hitler s Crack Guards Take Charge As
Brown Shirts Disappear From Streets, 11 Chicago Tribune, 2 July
1934, p. 2. See Appendix A.
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who think the Nazi system is likely to undergo fundamental
changes would at this stage seem more correct than those who
are looking for an early overthrow of Hitler. 1113 The paper
went on to add two days later (July 1st) that while 1 prophecy 1
was impossible, some form of change seemed likely in Germany as

the people became 1 desperate. 114 Again as news of the extent to
which Hitler had 1 purged 1 his opposition became known, the Times
Dispatch responded with an editorial on July 3rd, dubbing this

incident 11 the most ruthless massacre known to modern times. 1115
Furthermore, as the accompanying editorial cartoon (attached p. 76) illustrates, could Hitler ultimately succeed in purging
all the other major political forces in Germany in order to
quench his thirst for a total dictatorship? 16
The most thorough and accurate coverage given to this
event, however, was provided by the New York Times and the Wash
ington Post.

13

Aside from their extensive day-to-day reports, the

Descent From the Mount, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 29
June 1934, p. 6.
11

14

11 A Revolution in Germany, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
1 July 1934, sec. 3, p. 2.
15
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1934, p. 6.

16

Heads Shall Roll, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 July ·

1
11
Fred Seibel, 1 Can He Purge Them-Too?,
Times-Dispatch, 3 July 1934, p. 6 .
1

1

11

Richmond
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Times tried to analyze the basis for the purge itself, while
the Post sought to evaluate its overall impact.

In a Times

article by correspondent Eugene Young appearing on July 1st, the
following conclusion was tendered:

11Hitler sought to establish

a unitarian, authoritarian state on two contradictions. One was
the supreme party, which was to end factionalism, but was itself
divided ...• The other was the dictatorial government, in which
17
these...powers were divided between.irreconcilable elements.11
These differences were to lead to what another correspondent
(Frederick Birchell) termed 'neither a revolution, nor a coup
d'etat, nor a counter-revolution, but authoritarian action
intended to head off any of the three.118 This attempt to deal
with the looming internal dissension within Germany was later
portrayed by the Times in an editorial cartoon carried on July
8th (attached - p. 77).19
Similar attention to the plight of the German Republic
was given by the Washington Post, whose editorial on July 1st

17

Eugene Young, 11Long Concealed Rivalry Breaks Bounds
in Reich,11 New York Times, l July 1934, sec. 4, p. 1. See
Appendix A.
18
Frederick Birchell,. 11Hitler Crushes Revolt by Nazi
Radicals-Von Schleicher Is Slain, Roehm A Suicide -'Loyal Forces
Hold Berlin In An Iron Grip,11 New York Times, l July 1934, p. l.
19
p. 5.

11The Specter,11 New York Times, 8 July 1934, sec. 4,,
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noted that Hitle� could not 'indulge in bloody Saturdays for
ever. 1 20 An editorial the following day stated further: 11The
man whose mission it was to lead Germany out of enslavement has
dragged his country into a servitude far more degrading than any
alien conqueror could impose.1121 With remarks such as these, both
the Times and the Post succeeded in providing the most complete
picture of what was actually happening in Germany among all the
papers included in this survey.
The remaining group of publications added unique contri
butions of their own to the general assessment of the Blood Purge
in Germany. The Atlanta Constitution compared this incident to
those involving the famous gangster Al Capone, especially when his
gang tried to 'muscle' in on him.22 11(A) dictator's road to power
is spattered with blood and littered with the corpses of those who
stood in his way.1123 As 'hysteria soon turned to slaughter,'

20
11Gennany 1 s Crisis,11 Washington Post, l July 1934, sec.

B, p •. 4:.

21

"Stripping The Mask, 11 Washington Post, 2 July 1934, p. 8.

22

Paul Mallon, "News Behind the News, 11 Atlanta Constitution,
4 July 1934, p. 4. See Appendix A.
23

Germany's Blood Bath,11 Atlanta Constitution, 3 July

11

1934, p. 6.

Hitlerism now stood discredited throughout the world due to
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the recent tact,cs employed to consolidate the Fuhrer's strength.
The Los Angeles Times offered the opinion that this purge was the
point "from which the fall of the Hitler regime will be pegged

24
by history.11

As the rest of Europe began to align itself

against her, the internal situation within Germany continued to

125
worsen and the Times speculated Hitler's ouster was 'probable.
�inally, the Dallas Morning News concluded that after further
reorganization from within the Party occurred, Hitler would
undoubtedly modify his actions and hopefully restore order.
"Chancellor Hitler will retain his leadership, but he will
doubtless...turn to the Right and become more conservative in
his policies.11

26

While it has become apparent that the editors of the
papers included in this survey differed quite widely in their
assessment of Hitler's true intentions, much of this disparity
could be attributed to the unpredictable nature of the Fuhrer
Furthermore, while the editors have seemed to become

himself.

extremely reluctant to predict the outcome of the turmoil in
Germany, often the same arguements and factors used to substantiate

24
"The German Situation," Los Angeles Times, 6 July 1934,
sec. 2, p. 4.
25
"The Outlook For Hitler," Los Angeles Times, 29 June
1934, sec. 2, p. 4.
26

"Unrest in Germany," Dallas Morning News, 2 July 1934,
sec. 2, p. 2.
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one point of view could be legitimately employed to support
exactly the opposite position.

In this chapter, for instance,

one group of papers regarded the purge as a process consolidating
Hitler's power, while another group saw it as evidence of the
regime's weakness.
and understandable.

Both of these conclusions were logical
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Dispatch, 3 July 1934, p. 6.
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nThe Specter, II New York Times, 8 July 193 ,1·' sec. 4., p. h�·
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Chapter Six
THE PASSING OF A LEGEND AND REARMAMENT
August 1934 - March 1935
Narrative of Events
After Hitler had consolidated his position within the
Party and simultaneously appeased the Army's demand to bring
the S.A. under control, only the ailing and senile von Hindenburg
obstructed his assumption of total power. It was apparent that
the aged warrior was rapidly succumbing to the illness that had
plagued him for years, and Hitler eagerly anticipated the vacancy
that would be created by his death.

The official government

bulletin on the Field Marshall's health was guarded in its
assessment, but Hitler dispassionately moved to pass legislation
to ensure his own succession to power once Hindenburg was gone.
This new law merged the office of the President with that of the
Chancellor, based on the power given Hitler via the Enabling Act
in 1933, though ignoring the guarantees set forth in this measure
that the office of the Presidency would be inviolate.1

1

Fest, Hitler, p. 474.

79
Finally, on August 2, 1934, at nine in the morning,
Hindenburg breathed his last; Hitler 1 s dictatorship could now
be consumated in an orderly fashion. The Minister of the Interior
was instructed to arrange for a plebiscite so that all of Germany
could confirm and bestow legal sanction on Hitler 1 s power.
Furthermore, the Army was called upon to pledge unconditional
support to Hitler.

This oath of personal fealty, which would

forever tie the military to Hitler and his Nazi regime, would allow
basically 'honorable' men to comit some of the most hideous crimes
of this century, all in the 'line of duty•.2 This same oath was
soon required of most government and bureaucratic officials, and

thereby the image of the monarchy was resurrected within Germany.3
The services for the deceased President gave the Fuhrer
the opportunity to further consolidate his symbolic and actual
grasp on the reigns of power.

It was a time to eulogize the

legendary figure who had just passed away, while reminding everyone
that the wave of the future lay in the ideology of National Socialism
as interpreted by Adolf Hitler. The Minister of Propaganda, Or.
Goebbels, produced the proported Last Will and Testament of the

Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 240-43.
3

Fest, Hitler, p. 475.
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President, which contained stirring words of praise for Hitler
and an appeal that the people of Germany support him.

This was

a particularly effective tool just four days before the plebiscite,
the results of which were predictable.

What Hitler termed the

people's chance to affirm or deny the policies of its leaders
became merely a rubber stamp of what had already taken place.
Yet Hitler was less than enthusiastic at the outcome of
the voting; for instead of the 100 percent affirmation given in
most totalitarian states, almost four and a half million voters
had the courage to reject the Fuhrer and his policies.

For some

elements of the opposition, this vote was the last gasp of indig
nation and resentment towards a man who had wantonly disregarded
the Constitution of the Republic and the rights of nearly every
citizen in Germany.
now complete.

Their protest was futile; the verdict was

Roughly ninety percent of the electorate had gone

along with Hitler's desire to start a 'thousand year Reich' which
would be unsurpassed by any other nation.4
The long revolution was supposedly over, but in many ways
it had just begun.

The next move was to restore confidence both

at home and abroad that things would soon be back to normal and

4
Bullock, Hitler, p. 171.
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that the new government would proceed in an orderly fashion to
implement programs that would best serve the national interests.
One of the most important items on this agenda included a directive
by Hitler himself for the military to begin rearmament. The Army
was encouraged to triple its size and strength immediately; the
Navy was to start construction of high tonnage vessels, as well
as submarines and u-boats; the Air Force was expanded under the
leadership of Goering and the training of additional combat pilots
commenced; and the industrial sector of the economy was instructed
to prepare for the massive effort that would be required to bring
Germany back to military parity with the rest of Europe.5 All of
these moves were in direct violation of the treaty signed at
Versailles, yet they were accepted as necessary if Germany was to
ever become a major power again.
The only problem remaining concerned the public announce
ment of what most Allies already knew.

Hitler was convinced they

would accept his actions in exchange for further guarantees about
collective security, but he was anxious to avoid tying his hands
by such an agreement.

Ultimately the excuse he was looking for

presented itself when the French decided to double their period for
military service and lower the age for enlistment; this move allowed
Hitler the opportunity to justify Germany's own resumption of con
scription as a necessary response. Throughout Germany he was

5

Shirer, Rise� Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 281-84.
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hailed as a hero, for finally the shackles of Versailles were
destroyed, and the people could hold up their heads with honor.
Hitler's gamble had worked, and now his aims for further expan
sion could proceed.
* * * * * * * * * *
Editorial Analysis
Various domestic events continued to dominate the headlines
provided by the American press, centering almost exclusively upon
the figure of Franklin Delano Roosevelt during this interval-the
man as well as the President.

In August of 1934, front-page coverage

was given to his recent vacation cruise, in addition to his tour of
the proposed sight of the Grand Coulee Dam. During March of 1934,
the topic was now Roosevelt's numerous victories in the Senate on
proposals relating to the various public works projects (i.e. the
amount of funds to be allocated and the wages to be paid).

Yet one

receives the impression that the developments in Germany were gain
ing ground on domestic issues in terms of the attention devoted by
the news media, and the seriousness of this situation abroad was
gradually becoming felt.6
The American press was virtually unanimous in its acknow
ledgement of the accomplishments of the aged Field Marshall, both

6

This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers.included in this study.
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as a political and military leader. One of the real giants-of·
his day, possibly no other paper offered more stirring words of
praise for von Hindenburg than the Washington Post. In its
editorial of August 3rd, it stated: "There are periods in history
when the entire race of man...is for a moment struck silent by
the awful significance of some terrestrial event.... (The) name
and fame of Paul van Hindenburg are safe with the immortals.
History will (indeed) probably regard this stern old Prussian in
much the same manner it regards... Robert E. Lee.

Both were great

leaders of men. 11 7 A similar assessment was offered by a former
war correspondent for the Post who knew von Hindenburg personally,
Col. Edwin Emerson.. His articl� spoke of the near universal grief
now being experienced in Germany as the 'grand old man 1 passed
away.8 Finally, one other foreign correspondent, Aniou Angelo,
noted the beginning of a new era for Germany- as the last remaining
bond between the old and the new was now severed with Hindenburg's
death.9

71

1

p. 8.

The Majesty of Defeat, 11 Washington Post, 3 August 1944,

8

Col. Edwin Emerson, "Germans Mourn Their 11 Grand Old Man 11
as a Father, 11 Hashington Post, 5 August 1934, sec. 2, p. l. See
Appendix A.
9

Anious Angelo, "Europe Fearful As Germany Loses Hindenburg's
Stability, 11 Washington Post, 5 ·August 1934, sec. 2, p. 5. See
Appendix A.
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Although Hindenburg 1 s death itself commanded tremendous
attention, the consequences of his passing to Germany and the
rest of the world were also in the forefront of the news.

The

Los Angeles Times pointed to an alarming new European crisis,
as the Nazis and Junkers struggled to gain control over a powerful
nation.

Furthermore:

11

Hitler 1 s accession to complete power will

be viewed with favor nowhere outside Germany.

It will aid in

completing the isolation of the Reich. 1110 The Minneapolis Tribune
believed, in fact, that Hindenburg had been the only man either in
or out of government capable of keeping the extremist policies of
the Nazis in check.
withdrawn.
simply:

11

Now, ominously, the buffer was irrevocably

The only consolation the Tribune could offer was
While the world may be most concerned about the immediate

future of Germany, in learning of the death of Der Alte, it is not
left without the hope that a people that could produce a van Hinden
burg and admire him as it did will not surrender itself completely
to a course in human affairs that is beneath it. 11

1

1

The Richmond Times-Dispatch related similar feelings of
apprehension concerning the vast power which Hitler now wielded in

10

11 New European Crisis, 11 Los Angeles Times, 2 August 1934,
sec. 2, p. 4.

11

11 The Death of a Soldier, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 3 August
1934, p. 14.

Germany.12 Yet is also noted the somber reality that there
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was no one for the people to rally around even if they so
desired.13 Thus the total repercussions of von Hindenburg's
passing were still uncertain for Germany- as the editorial cartoon
of August 3rd (attached, p. 92) seems to indicate. 14 The New
York Times concurred, and in its editorial of August 2nd, noted
that Hindenburg had stood before the Reich as 'the pillar' of a
nation's hope.15 Now, as one foreign correspondent for the Times
Otto D. Tolischus- put it;

11

At a critical moment in her history

Germany has lost another pilot. Cut adrift from the moorings of
the past, she is like a ship in a brown setting out on a turbulent
sea, under the command of a man with a strong, arbitrary will.
Already she is being buffeted by whirlwinds of world hostility.11 16

12

"Hindenburg's Heir," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2 August
1934, p. 6.
13

11 Hitler at the Top," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August
1934, p. 4.

14
"After Hindenburg-What?" Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3
August 1934, p. 10.
15

16

"Hindenburg," New York Times, 2 August 1934, p. 16 .

Otto D. Tolischus, German Anxious Over Nazi Course,
New York Times, 3 August 1934, p. 1. See Appendix A.
11

11
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Where this man, Adolf Hitler, was to lead Germany and the rest
of the world was still unknown- but it was felt the power which
he now had at his command remained 11 unequaled...since the days
of Genghis Kahn. 1117
In marked contrast to the opinions offered above, most
of the remaining publications in this study suggested that Hinden
burg 1 s passing would have only a minimal impact in the final
analysis. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, believed this
development would simply eliminate the need for the empty gestures
of Hitler obtaining the President 1 s approval for policies he
intended to implement anyway.

11

In the last analysis, the death

of Hindenburg and Hitler 1 s succession to the presidency will...
cause but little change in existing conditions. 1118 The Chicago
Tribune further emphasized that Hindenburg's influence had been
diminishing for quite some time, and he was little deterent to
the Nazi movement at the time of his death.

11

We must...guess at

the effect the removal of the great man will have upon the internal
conditions and external relations of Germany and the world.

(Yet)

we may assume that it will not be as momentous as it might have
been earlier...in Germany. 1119

17

Frederick Birchell, "Hitler Endorsed 9 to l In Poll On
His Dictatorship, But Opposition is Doubled," New York Times,
20 August 1934, p. 1.
· 18

"Hitler Tightens The Reins, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 3
August 1934, p. 8.
19
"Hindenburg Departs," Chicago Tribune, 3 August 1934, p. 12.
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The remaining two papers, the Dallas Morning News and
the Rocky Mountain News, shared the belief that the once great
giant who had led Germany in the past had become but a feeble old
man looking for his eternal rest. The Dallas paper noted in its
editorial of August 3rd; "Had death ended his vigorous old age
at the moment when his personal popularity had defeated the present
Chancellor in the race for the chief official post of the Republic
.•..there would have been no subsequent obscuring of the famous
soldier.1120 And finally along this same line, the Rocky Mountain
News said:

"Maybe history's verdict will be that the eyes of the

weary giant had seen too much of strife, the great heart leaped
too often to the call of courage; that he who bent before the
Nazi weaklings was not Von Hindenburg, the idol, but an enfeebled
old man waiting for the grave.1121
Turning to the subsequent issue of rearmament, the action
itself was greeted with mixed emotions, ranging from quiet
acceptance to utter surprise and anguish. The latter opinion was
particularly obvious in the Atlanta Constitution and Los Angeles
Times, which predicted the reaction of the other nations of the
world would be to isolate Germany completely. As the editorial
carried in the Constitution on March 19th stated flatly:

"The

chief result of the Hitler defiance... will be to bring about a

20

"President Von Hindenburg," Dallas Morning News, 3
August 1934, sec. 2, p. 2.
21

"Hindenburg," Rocky Mountain News, 3 August 1934, p. 10
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close defensive a11iance between Great Britain, France, Italy
and Russia. Such an a11iance...wou1d build an iron ring around
Germany, and the nation would be far more he1p1ess than it is
now. 1122 The Times concurred and added:

"The general consensus

seems to be that Hit1er 1 s new 1 putsch 1 • • • will result in a new
ring of alliances (around Germany).1123 Yet these ominous develop
ments were not new to Europe, as pointed out in an editorial
carried by the Richmond Times-Dispatch on March 24th.

11

There

would seem to be a sinister significance...in the fact that
events prior to the World War are so similar to those in recent
days. It is to be fervently hoped, however, that the ultimate
denouement wi11 be far different... (and) the nations of Europe
will not...be dragged once more into the bloody maelstrom of
war... 24
A number of the other papers included in this study were
reluctant to condemn Hit1er 1 s actions, seeking instead to remind
the public that the Allies were partially to blame themselves.
The Minneapolis Tribune called the idea of 'an unarmed Germany in

22

11

1935, p. 6.

Hitler 1 s Bold Step, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 19 March

23

"Isolating Germany, 11 Los Angeles Times, 19 March 1935,
sec. 2, p. 4.
24
"Ominous Parallel," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 March
1935, sec. 4, p. 2.
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the midst of an armed European community' an anomaly which
could only exist temporarily.25 The Washington Post went even
further by calling rearmament a matter of national honor.
her it is more than a matter of life and death.

11

To

It is a matter

of the fundamental honor of an organized people ....The clauses
of enforced disarmament are binding upon Germany only on the
assumption that she is a servile state. And no other peace treaty
in modern history ever attempted this.

11

(Note the editorial

26

cartoon appearing on the same day attached at the end of this
chapter, p. 93.) 27
The several remaining publications (including the Chicago
Tribune, the Dallas Morning News, and the New York Times) concen
trated almost exclusively upon the enthusiasm and support of the
German people for rearmament, rather than the shockwaves which it
sent throughout the world. The Tribune's correspondence, Sigrid
Schultz, reported the reaction as being 'delirious' among the

25

The Failure of Disarmament, Minneapolis Tribune,
19 March 1935, p. 6.
11

11

26

"Germany Breaks Her Fetters," Washington Post, 18 March
1935, p. 8.
27

Gene Eldermann, Stormy Weather, Washinaton Post, 18
March 1935, p. 8.
11

11

Germans.28 The News called it a 1sensation. 1 29 With this
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single stroke Hitler had succeeded in uniting the country
behind him, and as one Times article stated, all Germans shall
11rise up and cheer...Hitler's challenge to the world.1130
The final paper in this survey, the Rocky Mountain News,
looked upon this situation with grave reservations. It saw this
latest action as simply a part of the same old power game in
Europe. Thus the United States should stay alert to the possi
bility of becoming entangled in another foreign war. To this
end, the News stated in its editorial of March 19 th:

11We believe

it is the duty of an American newspaper to help keep the nation
from becoming involved in another nation's quarrel.... America
has its own mission in the world... (and) its own people and...
shores to protect.1131
Although the editors continued to differ in their inter
pretations, gradually a consensus began to emerge. Furthermore,

28

Sigrid Schultz, "Germans Arm; Scrap Treaty, 11 Chicago
Tribune, 17 March 1935, p. 1.
29

11 Another European Crisis, 11 Da11 as Marning News_, 19 March
1935, sec. 2, p. 6.
30

Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Germans Jubilant Over Hitler's
Act, 11 New York Times, 18 March 1935, p. 8. See Appendix A.
31
11The Threat of War, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 19 March
1935, p. 8.
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the coverage provided to these developments in Germany continued
to expand in each of these papers.

These two observations are

probably related, since both could be attributed to a growing
awareness of the seriousness of the situation in Europe.

92

"After Hindenburg--l�hat? 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch
3 August 1934, p. 10.
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Chapter Seven
THE REPUDIATION OF LOCARNO AND MOVEMENT INTO THE RHINELAND
March 1936
Narrative of Events
For the remainder of 1935 and into the early part of 1936,
Hitler watched with anxious anticipation for the right moment
whereby he could achieve another coup in foreign policy.

With

the League of Nations enbroiled in a losing effort to stem Italy's
aggression in Ethiopia, an opening was created for Hitler to
exploit the existing controversy surrounding the Franco-Soviet
Mutual-assistance pact.1 The Fuhrer met with the French ambassador,
Francois-Poncet, on November 21, 1935, to voice his protests against
the pact, leaving the emissary with the distinct impression that
he had every intention of using this treaty as an excuse to march
troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. Little did the French
know that preparations had been made as early as the previous spring
by General Blomberg to accomplish exactly that aim.

The only

question still lingering was when.
Within France, the issue of an alliance with the Soviets had
caused considerable controversy among the more conservative elements
of the society.

Hitler was, in fact, fearful that the French Chamber

Fest, Hitler, p. 496.
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might reject th� proposal, and then he would be forced to find
another pretext upon which to justify his plans.2 When th� pact
was decisively ratified on February 27th, Hitler felt the time
was right to go ahead with his scheme.
While most of the German generals were wary of taking
military action in the face of potentially superior forces, Hitler
was firm in his belief that the Allies lacked both the nerve and
resolve to oppose him.

Despite numerous reservations, Blomberg

gave the order for the army to move, while everyone waited breath
lessly to see what would happen. The token German force met with
no resistance, and thus victory seemed to hinge on the willingness
of France and Britain to become involved in armed conflict.
In retrospect it is apparent that this was a major turning
point for all of Europe.

Had the Allies taken the initiative to

resist Hitler and his expansionist policies on this occasion,
-they could easily have defeated him and the history of the twentieth
century may have been drastically altered. The Germans were both
outnumbered and outgunned, with no 'legal' justification for their
obvious breach of the Treaty of Locarno.

Yet Hitler had always

been ingenious in his use of the element of surprise, and he
wielded the weapon so effectively that it created doubt and inde
cision on the part of his adversaries.

Knowing the French were

currently facing severe economic problems at home, in addition to

2
Shirer, Rise! Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 290-94.
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political strife in several areas, he correctly judged that the
present administration was in no position to challenge him,at
this time.
On the morning of March 7th, while the German Army pro
ceeded into the Rhineland, the Foreign Minister calmly advised
the British, French, and Italian ambassadors of this latest move,
and the 'compelling' reasons they had for abandoning the Treaty.3
Then as a bitter twist to the melodrama currently unfolding,
Hitler called for a new peace treaty to be established among the
major powers of Europe.

He claimed that Germany had not been

eager to rearm or to reoccupy the Rhineland, for he argued, it
was France who had betrayed the Allies by signing an agreement
with Russia, thereby nullifying the Treaty of Locarno.

Hitler

had only responded by taking the steps which he felt were neces
sary to defend the national interests of Germany, and peace
remained a primary objective in his own mind.

The rhetoric

seemed to work, and once again Hitler had gambled and won!
This small military venture added immensely to his already
wide popularity at home, and it also taught his subordinates never
to question his judgment. This one token victory was also to
enhance his confidence for further military expansion, while con
firming his suspicions that appeasement could be a useful tool in

3

Bullock, Hitler, pp. 190-91.
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diplomacy.

He called upon the people of Germany to voice their

opinion at the polls, and the results were overwhelming.

Approxi

mately ninety-nine percent of the electorate supported his actions,
and the Fuhrer was now in a position to embark upon his great
dream of creating an unparalled German civilization which would
spread throughout the world.
* * * * * * * * * *
Editorial Analysis
The events in Europe were now being regarded as serious
enough to warrant closer coverage in the newspapers. On the
domestic front, the President had recently signed a neutrality
bill aimed at avoiding American entanglement in Europe, while
businessmen were urged to refrain from capitalizing on foreign
conflicts.

A new farm aid package was passed in Congress, and a

proposal to increase corporate taxes was under consideration.
The Presidential race was also beginning to heat up during this
period, as Republicans sought to raise $1 million for the upcoming
campaign.4
Turning to the developments in Europe, the reaction to
Hitler's move to expand his power and influence was generally

4
This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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mixed. The press displayed both apprehension and uncertainity,
and even at this late stage there appeared a wide diversity of
opinion as to the direction in which Germany was going. Many
of the publications involved in this study regarded this overt
military move into the Rhineland as proof that war was in the
offing; others maintained that this was little more than a
symbolic flexing of Hitler's newly found strength.
One of the more popular explanations to Hitler's Rhineland venture suggested that war was his ultimate aim. This
belief was shared by the editors and staff of the Atlanta Consti
tution, the Chicago Tribune, and the Rocky Mountain News. The
only real distinction among their views centered around the
question of timing for Hitler's next act of aggression. The
Rocky Mountain News held the opinion that war was just around the
corner, as it colorfully described in its editorial of March 10th:
11

The prospects for European or perhaps world war were bright enough

last week...now they are blinding.... It's a cockeyed-world.•.slanted
and twisted awry. 115 A similar expression of concern was voiced by
the Chicago Tribune, which related in its editorial on the event:
1

1

If the so-ca11ed statesmen who imposed the treaty upon Germany had

shown something resembling political and economic prudence...there
probably would have been no Nazi revolution; the time has come when

5

11

This Cock-Eyed World, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 10 March

1936, p. 8.
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the dictator must obtain foreign victories, either of diplomacy
or war....Hitler is plainly at that point now. 118

(Note the

editorial cartoon carried on March 12th - attached, p. 104,
which effectively illustrates this position.) 7

Finally the

Atlanta Constitution emphasized the long-term implications of
Hitler's actions, while admitting the move had been brillantly
timed psychologically. The other nations of Europe were currently
preoccupied with critical internal problems of their own, and were
unlikely to respond militarily to this newest venture.8 "The
whole ...movement is being classified in diplomatic files as
another event which will lead up to war in a year or so, but
probably not (any) sooner.119
Another group of papers assumed exactly the opposite
stance about the likelihood of war and offered evidence to support
their position. The Dallas Morning News, for example, believed
that Germany would in all probability retain control of the Rhine-

6

"Versailles Again,11 Chicago Tribune, 10 March 1936, p. 12.

7

"The War Makers," Chicago Tribune, 12 March 1936, sec.

p. 1.

?,

8

"Europe's Cauldron Fumes,11 Atlanta Constitution, 10 March
1936, p. 6.
9

Paul Mallon, "News Behind The News," Atlanta Constitution,
10 March 1936, p. 6.
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land and that o�ly 'paper protests' would follow. "The results
(are in) the laps of the gods. It is almost to be assumed that
Italy will join Germany in renouncing the Locarno Pact. France
would like to act against Germany but must first appeal to the
League...England, it may be sure, will not pledge to go to war

with France against Germany... (but will) seek to preserve peace.1110
The editorial ·of March 10th in the Minneapolis Tribune was equally
realistic in pointing out the ineffectiveness of any treaty to
guarantee peace, especially one that was both punitive and humil
iating in nature. War remained no more inevitable now than it had
been over the preceding years.

"It seems to be generally agreed

in the principal capitals of the world that Germany's action...
need not mean war... (For) it is important to recognize that the
treaties which are being destroyed are suffering that fate, in
part at least, because they were called upon to perform an impos
sible task....They sought to impose restrictions on the sovereignty
of Germany which none of the other signatories of treaties would
1
accept for itself.111 The Washington Post agreed with this analysis,
and recalled the proverb which said a 'dog that barks doesn't

10

"The Bit in His Teeth," Dallas Morning News, 9 March 1936,
sec. 2, p. 2.
11

What Are Treaties Worth," Minneapolis Tribune, 10 March
1936, p. 16.
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bite.

1

Thus in regards to the current situation, the more

warnings we received about the impending violence, the less
likely it was to occur.12
While most of the publications included in this survey
concerned themselves almost exclusively with the pros and cons
of Hitler launching a more extensive military venture, the remain
ing papers cited various other issues which they considered to be
of equal importance. The Los Angeles Times, for instance, re
garded the recent events as part of an elaborate chess game among
the assorted European nations designed for better positioning.
Since each of the signatories of the Locarno Treaty had repeat
edly violated the terms, why had Hitler chosen this particular
time to act, unless it was simply a well-calculated bluff to
gain a small diplomatic victory? 13

Further inconsistencies in

Hitler's behavior were also cited, specifically his remilitariza
tion of the Rhineland one day and his offer to initiate peace
negotiations the next.

11

Hitler 1 s plea of justification for violat

ing the Locarno Treaty because..• France did so first hardly holds
water •.. (Yet this) is not his only inconsistency....He tears up

12

Europe?,

11

13

Countess of Listowel (Special ·correspondent), War in
Washington Post 9 March 1 93 6, p. 9. See Appendix A.
11

It Is France's Move,
sec. 2, p. 2.
11

11

Los Angeles Times, 8 March 193 6,
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treaties with one hand and tenders fresh ones with the other.
With saber drawn, he offers to lead Europe into new paths of
peace.11 1 4 (Note the editorial cartoon of March 9th - attached,
p.

105,

carried in the Times which illustrates this point.) 15
In contrast to this line of thinking, the New York Times

focused most of its headlines and attention on the singular
issue of whether or not England would come to the assistance of
France in this matter. As one foreign correspondent for the
Times, Edwin James, reported in his article, the extent of the
current crisis could well turn on the attitude of London in
reaching a settlement.1 6 What the British position would be re
mained to be seen, yet Charles Selden (correspondent) for the
Times offered his belief following a speech by the British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden. 11The British Government makes a distinction
between German troops reoccupying their own territory and an invasion
of French territory, (thus it appears) the British have no intention

14

2, p. 4.
15

2, p. 4.
16

"A Squeeze Play?,11 Los Angeles Times, 10 March 1936, sec.
"Nazi Movement!," Los Angeles Times,

10

March 1936, sec.

Edwin James, 11Germany Tears Up Treaty of Locarno,11 New
York Times, 8 March 1936, sec. 4, p. 3.
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of giving milit�ry aid to France if she decides to use force to
compel Germany once more to evacuate the forbidden zone. 1117
Finally, the Richmond Times-Dispatch showed unique
insight in its attempt to identify with the German people, rather
than the government that was supposedly representing them.

11

This

newspaper has the utmost sympathy (for) the German people- as
distinguished from the gang which is in control of their country
and it would like to see that people receive justice at the hands
of the victors in the World War.

But it is frankly suspicious of

the assurances (of) their self-appointed spokesman-(Adolf
Hitler). 1118
In surranary, even by the year 1936 there was still no firm
consensus of opinion as to the developments in Germany.

Further

mor�, there was actually a wider range of editorial views expressed
in this chapter than in the preceding one.

Yet a growing awareness

and appreciation of the problems abroad led to an expanded coverage
of the European situation.

Consequently, even papers which had

been previously apathetic attempted to upgrade their standards.

17

Charles Selden, 11 London Will Seek To Restrain Paris, 11
New York Times, 9 March 1936, p. 1. See Appendix A.
18

11 Hitler Seizes the Rhine, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
8 March 1936� sec. 4, p. 2.
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CONCLUSION
The original aim of this study was to assess the extent
to which the American public was aware of the events occurring
in Germany between the years 1930-1936.

While definitive answers

to the question of public awareness are virtually impossible, it
appears from this critical survey that the press did remarkably
well in keeping the public informed of the ongoing developments.
The editors normally offered a wide variety of opinions, but they
almost never ignored the incidents themselves.
Among the papers examined, the --New York Times provided
the most extensive and accurate coverage of Hitler's career.
Not only did the Times recognize the threat posed by National
Socialism to the rest of the world at a very early stage, but it
constantly displayed an uncanny ability to correctly assess the
direction in which Hitler was moving.

The Chicago Tribune and

Washington Post likewise devoted a tremendous amount of space to
the German situation, yet the slant to their articles was often
devoid of any long range implications.

The Tribune tended to

focus on the human drama currently unfolding as the people of
Germany reacted to Hitler, while the Post assumed such a conserva
tive or guarded stance that it frequently minimized the underlying
significance to Hitler's position.
Furthermore, it may be �ignificant that each of these
papers were among the four included in this survey which utilized

1W
foreign correspondents quite freely.

While the by-line articles

of these reporters were predominantly narratives of the events,
rather than the analysis which might have been expected, it is
still interesting to note the greater attention and consistency
shown in the editorials of these publications.
Four of the papers included in this study (the Atlanta
Constitution, the Dallas Morning News, the Richmond Times-Dispatch,
and the Rocky Mountain News) provided only modest attention to the
disputes abroad and limited most of their commentary to a reflection
of the events after they had already occurred.

Possibly this could

be explained by the initial trouble they experienced in interpreting
Hitler's actions and the reluctance which understandably followed
in regards to making any further predictions.

Finally, the two

remaining newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and Minneapolis Tribune,
seemed relatively less concerned with the situation in Europe versus
domestic affairs.

Since it is doubtful that a paper could survive

for long without addressing the interests of its readers, this
would tend to imply that isolationist attitudes still prevailed
among their subscribers.
In summary, Hitler and National Socialism did not spring
up overnight; their gradual development attracted considerable media
attention.

During the period from 1930 to 1936, the press gradually

expanded the extent of its coverage ·and the quality of its analysis
of international affairs, and began to prepare the American people
for a world in which they could no longer afford to remain aloof.
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APPENDIX A
Biographical Information
Aniou Angelo
A foreign correspondent for the Washington Post, no further
information was available.
Frederick T. Birchell
Described as a 'spritely little Englishman', Mr. Birchell became
one of the foreign editors for the New York Times in 1925. By
1936, he succeeded in becoming the chief of the Times foreign
service, and was credited with much of the paper's success in
this field. For more information, see John Hohenberg's work
Foreign Correspondence - The Great Reporters and Their Times.
Gene Eldermann
An editorial cartoonist for the Washington Post, Mr. Eldermann
was noted for being 'none too abstemious or dedicated' to his
work. Yet few outside the newspaper profession realize just how
important an effective cartoon is to convey the correct impression.
For further information see Felix Morley's book entitled For the
Record.
Col. Edwin Emerson
Born in Dresden, Saxony on January 23, 1869. After rece1v1ng
his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1891, he later married
Mary Griswol in 1906. A member of the National Press Club, he
served many years as a foreign and war correspondent in Europe,
and occasionally wrote articles for the Washington Post.
Guido Enderis
Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on September 3, 1874, of Swiss parent
age, Mr. Enderis went to Germany as a foreign correspondent in
1916, and was interned there during World War I. He joined the
Associated Press in Berlin in 1917, and by 1929 was head of the
New York Times bureau there. Soon after the start of World War
Uhe was evacuated to Switzerland, where he suffered a stroke in
1945. He was never married, and died in April of 1948.
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Edwin L. James
Born in Irvington, Virginia on June 25, 1890, he attended Chesa
peake Academy for his primary school education. He received his
A.B. degree from Randolph Macon College in 1909, and married
Simone Tremoulet in 1918. Originally a reporter for the Baltimore
Sun, he joined the New York Times in 1915 as a war correspondent.
He became the chief European correspondent during the late 1920's,
and the managing editor of the Times in 1932. He was a member of
the Phi Beta Kappa society.
John F. Knott
Born in Austria on December 17, 1878, he attended both the Royal
Academy of Art in Munich, Bavaria, and the Holmes School of Illus
tration in Chicago. He married Carrie Louise Bowen of Dallas,
Texas, in 1907. Mr. Knott joined the staff of the Dallas Morning
News in 1905 as a cartoonist.
Frederick R. Kuh
Born in Chicago, Illinois on October 10, 1895, he obtained his
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1917. He married Renata
Boern of Vienna, Austria, in 1929. Originally a reporter for the
Chicago Herald, he became the European correspondent for the London
Daily Herald in 1921. By 1924, Mr. Kuh was a special correspondent
for the United Press Association in Europe, and occasionally con
tributed articles to the Atlanta Constitution.
Countess of Listowel
No information was available.
Paul Ma11on
Born in Mattoon, Illinois on January 5, 1901, he attended both
the University of Louisville and University of Notre Dame as an
undergraduate. Mr. Mallon began as a reporter for the Louisville
Carrier Journal in 1918, and joined the United Press in 1920. He
married Viola Wingreene in 1929, and inaugurated a Washington
column called the 'News Behind the News' in the early 1930's.
This column was frequently carried by the Atlanta Constitution.
Anne O'Hare McCormick
Described as a small, red-headed woman, Mrs. McCormick wrote free
lance articles while traveling with her husband across Europe.
She was noted for having 'something extra' in her works, conveying
what might have been called a sense of history. Additional infor
mation can be obtained in the book by Hohenberg.
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James North
While the editor of the Washington Post began to add editorial
cartoons in the early 1920 1 s, most of these were originally
obtained from syndicates. Mr. North joined the staff in the
mid-1920 1 s and his works appeared regularly over a decade. For
more information consult Chalmers M. Roberts• work: The Washington
Post - The First 100 Years.
Henry K. Norton
Born in Chicago, Illinois in October of 1884, Mr. Norton had an
extensive college background in which he earned his B.S., LL.B.,
and M.A. degrees. The author of numerous books, he contributed
works to the New York Times and various other joutnals. For
additional information consult Who's Who Among North American
Authors, vol. VI.
Sigrid Schultz
Born in Chicago, Illinois, Mr. Schultz received his college educa
tion at the University of Berlin. He became a foreign correspondent
for the Chicago Tribune in 1919, and by 1925 was put in charge of
the office there. He was also a member of the Federation Inter
nationale des Journalistes.
Frederick Seibel
Born in Durhamville, New York in October of 1886, Mr. Seibel studied
under many famous artists throughout this country. He began his
career as a commercial artist in 1911, and became a cartoonist for
the Utica Herald-Dispatch in 1915. He became an editorial cartoonist
for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in 1926, and received the Harmon
award for his work in 1926. He was married to Edna Anderson of
New York.
Charles A. Selden
Born in Nantucket, Massachusetts on October 10, 1870, Mr. Selden
received his A.B. degree from Brown University in 1893. He began
his journalist career as a reporter for the Providence Journal in
1893, and ult imately joined the staff of the New York Times in 1918.
Edmond Taylor
A foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, no information
was available.
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Otto Tolischus
Described as a calm, determined, professional newsman, Mr.
Tolischus graduated from Columbia University and received his
initiation into journalism in a Cleveland city newsroom. His
first European assignment was given to him by the International
News Service, and he later went to work for the New York Times.
Additional information is provided in the book by Hohenberg.
Joseph Willetts
Born in 1887, Mr. Willetts joined the staff of the Dallas Morning
News in 1923. Prior to this time he'had worked at the Denver
Post, the New York Times, and the Rocky Mountain News. As the
assistant managing editor of the Dallas Morning News, he died at
the age of 51 at Baylor University.
Eugene Young
A foreign correspondent for the New York Times, no additional
information could be located.

**Unless otherwise indicated, further information on each of
these journalists can be obtained in the appropriate volumn
of Who's -Who in America.
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APPENDIX B
Extent of Coverage

Paper

Hinden
1930 1932 Chan- Reich
Elec- Elec- eel- stag Blood burg
Rhine
tion tion lor Fire Purge Death land

Atlanta
Constitu
tion

+

+

*

*

*

Chicago
Tribune

+

+

+

+

+

*

*

+

*

*

*

*

*

+

+

*

*

*

+

+

+

+

+

+

*

*

+

+

Dallas
Morning
News
Los
Angeles
Times

*

Minnea
polis
Tribune

+

+

*

*

New York
Times

+

+

+

Richmond
Times
Dispatch

*

*

+

Rocky
Mountain
News

*

*

Washing
ton
Post

+

+

KEY TO SYMBOLS:

+

+ Substantial

+

+

*

Adequate

+

- Minimal

This is a subjective observation, determined on the basis of
relative coverage given to a particular event in this study.
It is not an attempt to directly quantify the actual coverage,
but to convey an impression which was provided to the author
through the research itself.
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APPENDIX C
Accuracy of Analysis

Pa�er

Hinden1930 1932 Chan- ReichRhineElec- Elec- eel- stag Blood burg
tion tion lor
Fire Purge Death
land

Atlanta
Constitution

+

Chicago
Tribune

+

Dallas
Morning
News

+
+

+

+

+
+

+

Minneapolis
Tribune

+

+

�

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+

+

+

Richmond
TimesDispatch
Rocky
Mountain
News
Washington
Post

+

+

Los
Angeles
Times

New York
Times

+

+

+

KEYS TO SUMBOLS:

+

+

+ Thorough and/or Accurate
- Superficial or Inaccurate

This is a subjective observation, determined on the basis of
relative coverage given to a particular event in this study.
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